The specific approaches towards the inspection of schools differ greatly across
education systems. An OECD commissioned literature review (Faubert 2009) for
example shows differences in the scope, methods, standards, data and instruments of
inspection between countries. The scope of school inspections varies according to the
level of power and influence granted to each inspectorate and the inspection style
used to evaluate schools. Hughes et al. (1997) suggest an inspection continuum,
ranging from ‘non-punitive’ inspections based on peer review controlled by the
profession to ‘punitive’ regimes characterized by managerial approaches subject to
Educ Asse Eval Acc
direct central government control. McGarvey and Stoker (1999) describe how regulators,
such as Inspectorates of Education, may range from collegial and emancipatory
(in which self-responsibility, self-evaluation and self-regulation is emphasized)
to a bureaucratic and technicist approach in which rules, procedures, accountability,
compliance and sanctions are central. This distinction is often characterised as that
between a policing style in which enforcement of rules is the main task of the
inspectorate as opposed to a consultancy approach in which persuasion, advice and
education are the main functions of the Inspectorate.
Inspection standards can vary from being based on indicators on teaching and
learning, which are often inspired by school effectiveness research, to ensuring the
conformity of schools with particular statutory requirements. Indicators used to judge
teaching and learning for example include the pedagogical and didactical behaviour of
teachers and the quality of the school curriculum which is often evaluated through
observations of lessons and analysis of textbooks and lesson plans of the school. The
conformity of schools to regulations typically involves checking the availability and use
of procedures, policies and protocols concerning for example, admission policies or
safety regulations and increasingly the satisfactory completion of school self-evaluation
documents. The body which conducts school inspections may be located on different
levels within the education system, ranging from the national centralized level to a more
decentralized level of a province, region or municipality (Whitby 2010).
Although many of these distinctions seem to be mutually exclusive in a logical
sense, there are also instances where inspectorates seem to combine different, sometimes
even contradictory, approaches and emphases in the various aspects of their
work. This may be due to the fact that inspections in some countries have been
entrusted not just with evaluative tasks but also with other functions (e.g. personnel
management). It is also related to the fact that the increased emphasis on school
inspection in recent decades is closely connected to the apparently contradictory
policy of making schools more autonomous and self-governing. High levels of school
autonomy are counterbalanced in some countries by systematic evaluations of
schools to assure the quality and effectiveness of school level decisions. Declining
student achievement results, as measured in international surveys such as PISA and
TIMSS, have also often spurred an increase in evaluation and control of schools even
in supposedly decentralized education systems. Gustafsson and Myrberg (in prep) for
example describe how the declining results in national evaluations and international
comparative studies prompted the Swedish government to separate the tasks of
steering and support of schools from those of evaluation and control. School inspections
are now, as a result, largely concerned with stricter control of quality and
ensuring compliance of schools with the law. Overall though it can still be argued
that, even though Inspectorates of Education in Europe vary in their approaches and
in their origins, they generally share a common purpose of improving teaching and
learning (Faubert 2009).
A recent literature review by Klerks (submitted; see also Ehren and Visscher 2008)
summarizes the effects of school inspections on behavioural change among teachers,
school improvement and student achievement results. Her systematic study of peerreviewed
articles that were published after 2000 and include empirical research
(preferably with a high score on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale, including
quasi-experimental research designs) shows plausible connections between
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inspection and school improvement and behavioural change among teachers. In
addition, Gray (cited in Visscher and Coe 2002, p. 2), Kogan and Maden (1999)
and Ehren and Visscher (2008) describe how schools use school inspections, and the
feedback provided during inspections, to implement improvements such as rules of
conduct for students, strategies for raising examination results, changes in monitoring
and assessment of students and changes in management styles and structures.
However, the overall results of inspection research are, at present, far from
conclusive. Klerks’ review shows small (positive and negative) causal effects of
school inspections on student achievement results. Luginbuhl et al. (2009) found
that test scores of Dutch primary students improved by 2 to 3 % of a standard
deviation in the 2 years following an inspection visit. In contrast, Rosenthal
(2004) reports a decrease in examination results in English secondary schools in
the year of the inspection visit. He explains this result by arguing that the
extensive preparation by schools for the visit may take time and energy away
from the teaching and learning process.
These reported declines in student achievement results may point to unintended
negative consequences of school inspections. Such negative consequences may occur
when schools implement procedures and protocols that have no effect on primary
processes in the school but just aim at receiving a positive inspection evaluation. In
effect, this means a (usually unintended) undue emphasis on the elements that are
assessed. Schools focus for example on programming a large number of lesson hours
instead of trying to improve the quality of lessons offered (when the inspection rubric
only measures the number of lesson hours) or they pursue short-term targets at the
expense of legitimate long-term objectives. Or again schools may construct selfevaluation
instruments to score positively on inspection indicators used for measuring
quality assurance, instead of implementing such instruments to improve the quality of
their education. These types of behaviours may negatively affect student
achievement.
School inspections are widely used, and they are charged with a key role in
the quest for quality. It is therefore of great importance to gain more knowledge
about the in-school processes which may take place between the inspection and
the ultimate goal, namely, the improvement of student performance (Husfeldt
2011, p. 1). We do not know how school inspections drive improvement of
schools and which types of approaches are most effective and cause the least
unintended consequences. The study presented in this paper intends to expand
this knowledge base by describing the assumptions regarding causal mechanisms,
linking school inspections to their intended outcomes of improved
teaching and learning in the cases of six different European Inspectorates.
Insight into these assumed causal mechanisms will help us identify those types
of school inspections that are considered to be most effective across Europe and
the mechanisms through which they are expected to affect school improvement.
The following research questions will be answered in this paper: