Weconsideranoutsourcinglogisticschannelwhereadistributorprocuresaquantityofafreshproduct
and outsourceshislogisticsoperationstoathirdpartylogisticsserviceprovider(TPLSP),whoselogistics
service qualityandpriceaffecttheproductsellablequantityandqualityonthemarket,andthe
distributor's orderdecision,respectively.Thedistributorsetshisorderquantityandproductsellingprice.
The determinationsoflogisticsservicequalityandpricedependonthechannelpowerstructures.We
investigateeach firm's decisionsunderatraditionalunitpricingcontractinthethreepowerbalance
scenarios wherethedistributorortheTPLSPhasthechannelpower,ortheyhaveequalpower.The
equilibriumresultsshowthatthepowerstructureshaveanimportantinfluence oncontractdesign,each
firm's decisionbehaviorsandchannelperformances.Wefurtherdeveloptwonovelincentivemechan-
isms tocoordinatethedecentralizedchannelconsideringtheriskpreferenceoftheTPLSP.Computa-
tional studiesshowthatthepowerstructures'influences increasewhiletheeffectsoflogisticsservice
qualityonproductquantityandqualityincrease,andillustratetheseincentivemechanismscanachieve
full channelcoordinationandwin–win outcomes.