n this method, the supplicant will re-use the same values of SNonce until the legitimate handshake is completed and PTK is installed in both the supplicant and authenticator [8]. This approach requires the supplicant to store the SNonce and derive a PTK based on the stored SNonce and the received ANonce. When the supplicant receives Message 3 from the authenticator, the supplicant will derive a PTK again from the stored SNonce and received ANonce to verify the MIC in Message 3. The advantage of this approach is that it eliminates memory exhaustion [8]. The supplicant is not required to store each SNonce which is computed after receiving each Message 1. However, more computational power is required at the supplicant side due to the fact that the computation of PTK is done twice. Hence, if an attacker is able to perform Message 3 flooding on the client, it might lead to CPU exhaustion [8].