2. What's next?
If Greece had voted yes, there would probably have to have been new elections — Europe doesn't trust Syriza to actually implement austerity — and, after that, negotiations would probably have continued along the same lines as before.
Now, while Syriza might think it has the better position with Europe, its mettle is going to be tested. The first signs of market reaction will come late Sunday when Asian markets open, and future markets were predicting a swoon Sunday night.
Even if it won the vote, Syriza may face pressure to accept a better deal, given that Greeks don't want to leave the euro.
But if the European Central Bank ultimately won't give Greece's banks the money they need, then there are only two ways for them to get it. Otherwise they'll crash and burn. That's to either take it from depositors or to print it. The first option, what's known as a bank bail-in, is what Cyprus did when the ECB stopped propping its banks up two years ago.
But the second option is available only if Greece has a currency it can print. It doesn't right now. It has the euro. So Greece would have to ditch it and bring back the drachma if it wanted to recapitalize its banks via the printing press. Both of these are painful, of course, but default and devaluation could be less so for the economy (more on that later).
In a research briefing July 3, Oxford Economics, a research group, posted the odds of Greece leaving the euro zone at 85 percent with a no vote. On Sunday afternoon, after the referendum vote, top banks including JPMorgan Chase and Barclays said a Greek exit from the euro zone is now their expectation.
Joseph Gagnon, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, explained the mechanics of the so-called "Grexit:"
The first step would be to enact legislation to convert all financial assets and liabilities and all commercial contracts and wage agreements issued under Greek law from euros to drachmas at par (one for one). Banks would need to close for at least a couple days, possibly more, to reprogram their systems. Legislation would also specify the introduction of drachma notes and coins at the earliest possible time, perhaps within six months.
The drachma would be allowed to float against the euro as soon as the banks reopen. It would surely depreciate, probably by a lot at first and with considerable volatility before settling down. It is impossible to predict how much the drachma would depreciate; in Iceland’s experience, the financial and debt crisis of 2008 caused an initial depreciation of nearly 40 percent that has since stabilized at around 25 percent in real (price-adjusted) terms. The euro notes and coins currently circulating in Greece would increase in value. During the months before drachma notes and coins are introduced, euro notes and coins would be used for small purchases, with merchants accepting them at the market-determined premium.
Government debt held by Greek financial institutions would be converted to drachmas at par. These institutions would be required to accept new government debt for principal and interest payments coming due. The government would declare a moratorium on principal and interest payments on the rest of its debt, including the debt of the Bank of Greece to the European Central Bank. Negotiations would begin on a restructuring of this nonconverted debt.