species of political quiescence in which 'once the observation has
been made that the justice model is bourgeois and arises from the
material relations of capitalism, nothing more is to be said or
done.'24 Each historically specific demand, whether for civil
liberties in the sixties or justice in the s~venties, must be judged in
its own terms. Similarly, for each current demand 'it is little solace
to someone who is not even being treated equally to be told that
the demand for equality is bourgeois and therefore inadvisable.'25
Unlike the attractive but somewhat socially disembodied liberal
idea of justice, Greenberg suggests a socialist programme which
would: (i) endorse a principle of punishment and responsibility
(within clear limits based on the nature of the violation and allowing
for mitigating circumstances); (ii) be committed to abolishing
the criminogenic features of the system which conservatives are
committed to preserving; and (iii) be encouraged to think about
questions of protection from state repression in socialist societies.
If the second part of this programme distinguishes it from conservatism
and neo-liberalism, the third part is equally important
as a counter to leftist romanticism about legal control in countries
which call themselves socialist. This century's history of popular
justice, revolutionary justice and socialist legality has by no means
been uniform, but its dominant traces have been shamefully
transparent. To go on mouthing these slogans as if nothing had
happened is not only dishonest but it also - as Greenberg notes
- removes the possibility of offering a concrete compelling vision
that things need not be as they are. My preference is to be pragmatic
about short-term possibilities but to be genuinely utopian
about constructing long-term alternatives.
By way of this selective and somewhat breathless survey of the
traditional terrain of criminal-justice politics, I can now state my
position in shorthand. That is to say, offer a guiding criterion for
evaluating 'community control' and other such forms of control
which this book has covered. I term this criterion moral pragmatism.
The 'moral' element affirms doing good and doing justice as
values in themselves. By 'doing good' I mean not just individual
concern about private troubles but a commitment to the socialist
reform of the public issues which cause these troubles. By 'doing
justice' I mean not equity or retribution but the sense of the rightness
and fairness of punishment for the collective good. By 'values
in themselves' I mean that both utilitarian and strategic considerations
should, where possible, be secondary to attaining these
values for their own sake and whatever their other results. Or - in
negative terms - utilitarian aims such as reducing crime should not