Intervention versus Pragmatism
In May 2010, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, during his brief visit to
Bangkok on his way to Naypyidaw, proposed a meeting between representatives of the Abhisit
government and leaders of the pro-Thaksin “Red Shirts” United Front for Democracy
against Dictatorship (UDD). Defending his initiative, Campbell reflected on his country’s
growing concern about Thailand’s violently escalating conflict, stating that this was because
Thailand was a treaty ally of the United States. But the traditional political elites were
not convinced. They viewed it as a move to manipulate the political situation in Thailand.
Immediately, Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya rejected Campbell’s role as peacemaker,
calling it a plot to meddle in his country’s domestic politics. In the end, the U.S. Embassy in 1
Bangkok managed to arrange a working breakfast between Campbell and Jaturon
Chaisaeng, a former cabinet member under Thaksin Shinawatra and a Red Shirts leader, and
Noppadon Pattama, former foreign minister and Thaksin’s legal adviser, without government’s
representatives. The meeting deeply infuriated leaders in Bangkok. They were astounded
by the seemingly fluctuating policy of the U.S. government, which had previously
been openly supportive of the traditional elite. Throughout the Cold War, the United States
had forged a close alliance with the military, the bureaucracy and the palace, in their fight
Ashayagachat, A. 2010. “U.S. Rebuked for Involvement in Thai Politics,” Bangkok Post. 1
2
Pavin Chachavalpongpun — Thailand in Sino-U.S. Rivalry
against the communists (Fineman 1997: 3). These intimate ties were, however, coming loose
following the change in the political landscape in Thailand in the recent years. Realizing
that there were new players entering the Thai political domain that did not align themselves
with the traditional elite, the United States sought to diversify its policy options and,
at least on the surface, reached out to the Red Shirts faction so as to ensure that its interests
would not be affected if the political proxies of the Red Shirts won the next election. Shawn
Crispin argued that the United States adopted an “interventionist approach” in order to
maneuver the Thai political situation to its own advantage and in doing so has befriended
and irritated both sides in Thailand’s conflict in equal measure (Crispin 2010). For example,
while Campbell’s initiative may have symbolized the United States’ sympathy toward the
Red Shirts movement, it was also reported that U.S. intelligence officials eavesdropped on
Thaksin and warned the Abhisit government against possible sabotage during the Red
Shirts’ rally, supposedly on Thaksin’s orders. This report disappointed the Red Shirts’ lead 2 -
ers, who felt that the United States could not be trusted. This interventionist approach was
again evident in the aftermath of the 2014 coup when the United States imposed a number
of sanctions against Thailand, hoping to use them to influence the behavior of the Thai military
state.
In contrast, China has strictly upheld a non-interference policy vis-à-vis Thailand. Since the
coup of 2014, leaders in Beijing have concentrated on “making money rather than enemies”
and have been content to stay neutral in Thailand’s polarized politics. Crispin noted that in
the subtle but intensifying competition for influence in Thailand and the region, China’s
pragmatic diplomacy throughout the recent Thai crisis has been more successful than the
United States’ interventionist approach (Crispin 2010). While certain Thai political players
regard the United States with suspicious eyes, they feel more comfortable with China’s position
in the conflict. Panitan Wattanayagorn, former acting government spokesman in the
Abhisit administration once said: “Our interests and international relations are becoming more
complex. We see advantages in the competition between superpowers. The United States has high
stakes in Thailand and they actively pursue their interests … China is less active and uses an indirect
approach and its handling of this situation was no different … China-Thailand ties are becoming more
and more dynamic and China is very pragmatic, but very keen in getting information and
reacting“ (Crispin 2010).
The above statement was reaffirmed by the Chinese Ambassador to Singapore, Wei Wei,
who stressed that China may be anxious to learn what has been going on in Thailand, but it
adhered to the principle of non-interference. He told this author, “These are Thailand’s internal
affairs.” The clash between the two approaches signifies a compelling rivalry between 3
the United States and China. Already, China’s non-interference approach has proven to be
effective in cementing its ties with Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and has now been met
with a favorable response from the Thai elite, who have insisted on handling their own internal
problems without outside pressure. The United States may be