Exchange rate policies surely exacerbated Asia=s problems. Governments in each of the
crisis countries kept their exchange rates fixed (or changed them at very predictable rates) in the
early 1990s, and gave every indication that these policies would remain intact in the future. These
policies helped encourage short-term capital inflows, since investors perceived little likelihood of
a loss from exchange rate movements. They also kept the prices of tradable goods and services
relatively fixed, while the prices of non-tradable goods and services (especially construction and
property) rose as a result of the investment boom. As a consequence, the real exchange rate
(measured as the ratio of the prices of tradables to nontradables) began to gradually appreciate
(that is, the ratio fell). Several studies have attempted to estimate the extent of the overvaluation
of the Asian currencies in early 1997. Although methodologies and data sources differ somewhat,
most analyses suggest that currencies became modestly overvalued, especially between 1994 and
1996.