According to Raiffa, the final outcome of any negotiation is usually the midpoint between the first two offers that fall within the bargaining zone. For this reason, it does not make sense to make offers that are wildly outside the bargaining zone. When we use the first offer made by each party as a measure of his or her aspirations, those aspirations or target points determine the "final demands" made by negotiators, more so than do BATNAs. Negotiators who set high aspirations end up with more of the pie than those who set lower aspirations. Negotiators whose aspirations exceed those of the counterparty get more of the bargaining zone. For exemple, negotiators who have unattractive reservation point and high aspirations demand more from their opponents than do negotiators with attractive BATNAs and low aspirations. Buyers who set more ambitious aspirations achieve better economic outcomes; however, the sellers they are dealing with regard them to be less likeable, and as aresult they are less willing to cooperate with them in the future. When negotiators make proposals that the other party considers extreme, it may cause the chilling effect. Making an extreme offer is a risky strategy because the recipirnt may be offended and walk away from the table. Both low-and high-power negotiators are equally offended by extreme offers, but it is low-power negotiators who.