-10-
UVA-F-1483
Berkshire Hathaway took a major stake in MidAmerican on March 14, 2000, with a $1.24
billion investment in common stock and a nondividend-paying convertible preferred stock.
28
This
investment gave Berkshire about a 9.7% voting interest and a 76% economic interest in
MidAmerican. “Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility industry, it’s possible
that we will make additional commitments in the field,” Buffett said, at the time. “If we do, the
amounts could be large.”
29
Subsequently, in March 2002, Berkshire acquired another 6.7 million
shares of MidAmerican’s convertible stock for $402 million, giving Berkshire a 9.9% voting interest
and an 83.7% economic interest in the equity of MidAmerican (80.5% on a diluted basis).
At the time of Berkshire’s initial investment in MidAmerican, Buffett explained that
acquisitions in the electric utility industry were complicated by a variety of regulations, including
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), which was intended to prevent
conglomerates from owning utilities and to impede the formation of massive national utilities that
regulators could not control. This regulation made it necessary for Berkshire to structure its
investment in MidAmerican such that it would not have voting control. Buffett had said he was
eager to have PUHCA scaled back, and that if it were repealed he would invest $10 billion to $15
billion in the electric utility industry.
30
PacifiCorp
For the past several years, Berkshire Hathaway had been unsuccessful in identifying
attractive acquisition opportunities. In 2001, Buffett addressed the issue head-on in his annual letter
to shareholders:
Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our
investment in the
Washington Post
in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the
combination of
ten
such ideas and a triple in the value of
each
would increase the net
worth of Berkshire by only ¼ of 1%. We need “elephants” to make significant gains
now—and they are hard to find.
31
By 2004, Berkshire’s fruitless search for “elephants” had begun to take its toll. In his annual
letter that year, Buffett lamented his failure to make any multibillion-dollar acquisitions, and he
bemoaned Berkshire’s large cash balance that had been accumulating since 2002. “We don’t enjoy
sitting on $43 billion of cash equivalents that are earning paltry returns,” Buffett said. “What Charlie
[Munger] and I would like is a little action now
-10-
UVA-F-1483
Berkshire Hathaway took a major stake in MidAmerican on March 14, 2000, with a $1.24
billion investment in common stock and a nondividend-paying convertible preferred stock.
28
This
investment gave Berkshire about a 9.7% voting interest and a 76% economic interest in
MidAmerican. “Though there are many regulatory constraints in the utility industry, it’s possible
that we will make additional commitments in the field,” Buffett said, at the time. “If we do, the
amounts could be large.”
29
Subsequently, in March 2002, Berkshire acquired another 6.7 million
shares of MidAmerican’s convertible stock for $402 million, giving Berkshire a 9.9% voting interest
and an 83.7% economic interest in the equity of MidAmerican (80.5% on a diluted basis).
At the time of Berkshire’s initial investment in MidAmerican, Buffett explained that
acquisitions in the electric utility industry were complicated by a variety of regulations, including
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA), which was intended to prevent
conglomerates from owning utilities and to impede the formation of massive national utilities that
regulators could not control. This regulation made it necessary for Berkshire to structure its
investment in MidAmerican such that it would not have voting control. Buffett had said he was
eager to have PUHCA scaled back, and that if it were repealed he would invest $10 billion to $15
billion in the electric utility industry.
30
PacifiCorp
For the past several years, Berkshire Hathaway had been unsuccessful in identifying
attractive acquisition opportunities. In 2001, Buffett addressed the issue head-on in his annual letter
to shareholders:
Some years back, a good $10 million idea could do wonders for us (witness our
investment in the
Washington Post
in 1973 or GEICO in 1976). Today, the
combination of
ten
such ideas and a triple in the value of
each
would increase the net
worth of Berkshire by only ¼ of 1%. We need “elephants” to make significant gains
now—and they are hard to find.
31
By 2004, Berkshire’s fruitless search for “elephants” had begun to take its toll. In his annual
letter that year, Buffett lamented his failure to make any multibillion-dollar acquisitions, and he
bemoaned Berkshire’s large cash balance that had been accumulating since 2002. “We don’t enjoy
sitting on $43 billion of cash equivalents that are earning paltry returns,” Buffett said. “What Charlie
[Munger] and I would like is a little action now
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