In this paper, we have combined a model of a broad credit channel for monetary transmission with a
theory on corporate incentives for risk management. The goal of our analysis was to examine the
theoretical relevance of the broad credit channel for monetary policy in a world with established
derivatives markets and greatly improved possibilities to manage risks. We have shown that the very
assumption at the heart of standard broad credit channel models of monetary transmission, namely the
existence of asymmetric information in the credit markets, generates incentives to engage in corporate
hedging strategies aimed at insulating the agency costs induced by asymmetric information from
changes in interest rates. Our model thus indicates that, given that financial derivatives are available,
firms subject to problems of asymmetric information should not be expected to accept their fate, that is,
the effects of balance sheet channel transmission, like lemmings. Instead, they will implement corporate
risk management strategies that are likely to significantly alter the sensitivity of the real economy to
changes in interest rates.