FROM BAD TO WORSE
All that may have ended well had eBay’s numbers turned around. But in 2008, eBay’s financials slid badly. In the last quarter of that year, typically eBay’s strongest with holiday shopping, eBay experienced its first ever quarterly decline. For its core marketplace, revenue was down 16 percent from the previous year, while net income dropped a whopping 31 percent. Even the increasing strength of its PayPal business couldn’t offset the losses in its marketplace business. It would have been very easy for Donahoe and his team to blame the company’s woes on the economic downturn. After all, with consumers concerned about job losses and the economy, retail
sales during the 2008 holiday season were the worst in decades. But as eBay experienced a drop in traffic, Amazon.com and Walmart enjoyed increases. It was also no secret that eBay had shown signs of weakness even before the Great Recession reared its ugly head. And during the tech bust and economic slowdown of 2001, eBay’s revenue had grown 74 percent and its stock more than doubled as consumers dumped used goods on the site. It was apparent that eBay’s problems were deeper than a bad economy. More than a year after Donahoe revealed his turnaround strategy, he made public statements about eBay’s direction and performance. His statements did not indicate a shift in strategy but rather a refining of the strategy the company had been executing. He promised that the eBay site would be easier to use, offer even better deals, and provide a more satisfying experience. “The ‘buyer beware’ experience has run its course,” he said. He reiterated eBay’s plans to focus on the secondary market. “We’re going to focus where we can win,” Donahoe said, indicating that the shift away from new merchandise where its biggest competitors dominated would give eBay a strong point of differentiation. “We have begun significant change. The eBay you knew is not the eBay we are, or the eBay we will become.” Donahoe also asked that the eBay community and its investors be patient; the plan would take three or four years to produce fruit. In addition to the strategy laid out for marketplace business, Donahoe announced that eBay would also divest itself of businesses that did not perform well or that were not relevant to its core mission of connecting buyers and sellers. He also noted that PayPal would be a core component of eBay’s growth and that it would produce an increasing proportion of the company’s revenue and profits. Although few doubted that the nonmarketplace aspects of eBay’s strategy would likely strengthen the company, Donahoe gave few new details as to how the company would correct its marketplace issues. Acknowledging the discontent of many eBay sellers, he asserted that eBay’s strategy wasn’t based on a zerosum game between big merchants and traditional eBay sellers. “We aren’t dictating who’s successful and not successful on eBay. All we’re doing is ensuring that the sellers who provide the things that buyers want get exposure and positive reinforcement.” Things have improved somewhat since Donahoe’s statements. But while its 2009 revenue increase of 2.2 percent was better than a decline, it paled in comparison to the 28 percent increase achieved by Amazon. And although eBay’s profits shot up 34 percent, much of that was from the sale of Skype and came in lower than analysts had expected. None of this goes against the promises made by Donahoe. The question is, will investors have enough patience to wait for his plan to work?