The New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 holds managers/directors liable for “reckless trading” as defined by any “substantial risk of serious loss”. Because this responsibility does not depend on actual loss or misfeasance, it exceeds those duties owed by directors of other countries and by directors under the previous New Zealand Companies Act of 1955. This increases the exposure of managers to personal liability for the debt of corporations to a degree significantly beyond previously existing international common and statutory law in the British Commonwealth. The liability extension implicitly taxes labour’s incentive to innovate; it implicitly taxes the ability of owners of corporations to raise capital for risky ventures. In aggregate, the marginal disincentives increases the cost of investment, distorts allocations towards the low end of the risk‐yield continuum, and decreases the technology‐based growth potential of New Zealand.
Pressure for a change in manager liability via a reform of the Companies Act arose from New Zealand’s entry into capital markets in the mid‐1980s. Deregulating its financial sector and floating its exchange rate, it found an influx of capital that caused in hindsight what we can call a speculative increase in its stockmarket value beyond what fundamentals could warrant. When companies collapsed with the crash of the New Zealand market in October 1987, investors began blaming the managers, rather than appreciating the unpredictability of returns that follow a sudden opening‐up of a country to international investment. New Zealand was hit doubly by their own speculative build‐up that burst at the same time as did international stockmarkets in the wake of the 500 point decline in the US Dow Industrial index. This led to Section 135 of the 1993 Companies Act which reimposes liability on managers of limited liability corporations.