1-8b Stockholders versus Bondholders
Conflicts can also arise between stockholders and bondholders. Bondholders
generally receive fixed payment regardless of how well the company does,
while stockholders do better when the company does better. This situation
leads to conflicts between these two groups.10 To illustrate the problem, suppose a
company has the chance to make an investment that will result in a profit of
$10 billion if it is successful but the company will be worthless and go bankrupt
if the investment is unsuccessful. The firm has bonds that pay an 8%
annual interest rate and have a value of $1,000 per bond and stock that sells for
$10 per share. If the new project—say, a cure for the common cold—is successful,
the price of the stock will jump to $2,000 per share, but the value of the
bonds will remain just $1,000 per bond. The probability of success is 50% and
the probability of failure is 50%, so the expected stock price is
Expected stock price = 0:5ð$2;000Þ + 0:5ð$0Þ = $1;000
versus a current price of $10. The expected percentage gain on the stock is
Expected percentage gain on stock = ð$1;000 − $10Þ=$10 x 100% = 9;900%
The project looks wonderful from the stockholders’ standpoint but lousy for the
bondholders. Bondholders just break even if the project is successful, but they lose
their entire investment if it is a failure.
Another type of bondholder/stockholder conflict arises over the use of additional
debt. As we see later in this book, the more debt a firm uses to finance a given
amount of assets, the riskier the firm is. For example, if a firm has $100 million of
assets and finances them with $5 million of bonds and $95 million of common stock,
things have to go terribly bad before the bondholders suffer a loss. On the other hand,
if the firm uses $95 million of bonds and $5 million of stock, the bondholders suffer a
loss even if the value of the assets declines only slightly.
Bondholders attempt to protect themselves by including covenants in the
bond agreements that limit firms’ use of additional debt and constrain managers’actions in other ways. We address these issues later in this book, but they are quite
important and everyone should be aware of them.
1-8b Stockholders versus Bondholders
Conflicts can also arise between stockholders and bondholders. Bondholders
generally receive fixed payment regardless of how well the company does,
while stockholders do better when the company does better. This situation
leads to conflicts between these two groups.10 To illustrate the problem, suppose a
company has the chance to make an investment that will result in a profit of
$10 billion if it is successful but the company will be worthless and go bankrupt
if the investment is unsuccessful. The firm has bonds that pay an 8%
annual interest rate and have a value of $1,000 per bond and stock that sells for
$10 per share. If the new project—say, a cure for the common cold—is successful,
the price of the stock will jump to $2,000 per share, but the value of the
bonds will remain just $1,000 per bond. The probability of success is 50% and
the probability of failure is 50%, so the expected stock price is
Expected stock price = 0:5ð$2;000Þ + 0:5ð$0Þ = $1;000
versus a current price of $10. The expected percentage gain on the stock is
Expected percentage gain on stock = ð$1;000 − $10Þ=$10 x 100% = 9;900%
The project looks wonderful from the stockholders’ standpoint but lousy for the
bondholders. Bondholders just break even if the project is successful, but they lose
their entire investment if it is a failure.
Another type of bondholder/stockholder conflict arises over the use of additional
debt. As we see later in this book, the more debt a firm uses to finance a given
amount of assets, the riskier the firm is. For example, if a firm has $100 million of
assets and finances them with $5 million of bonds and $95 million of common stock,
things have to go terribly bad before the bondholders suffer a loss. On the other hand,
if the firm uses $95 million of bonds and $5 million of stock, the bondholders suffer a
loss even if the value of the assets declines only slightly.
Bondholders attempt to protect themselves by including covenants in the
bond agreements that limit firms’ use of additional debt and constrain managers’actions in other ways. We address these issues later in this book, but they are quite
important and everyone should be aware of them.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..