The research has uncovered a striking reversal of fortune among the areas colonized by Europe; those that were relatively rich in the 1600s are today far poorer than the areas (such as the United States and Canada) that initially were viewed as relatively undesirable. Whereas traditional explanations of differences in long-run paths of development across the Americas generally point to the significance of differences in national heritage or religion. The main highlight is the relevance of contrasts in the degree of inequality in wealth, human capital, and political power in accounting for how fundamental economic institutions evolved over time. We argue, moreover, that the roots of these disparities in the extent of inequality lay in differences in the initial factor endowments (dating back to the era of European colonization). The systematic patterns by which societies in the Americas that began with more extreme inequality or heterogeneity in the population were more likely to develop institutional structures that greatly advantaged members of elite classes (and disadvantaging the bulk of the population) by providing them with more political influence and access to economic opportunities. For example when USA gave Africa billions of dollars but it actually made the people more poor. Sub-Saharan Africa has received tens of billions of dollars in foreign aid over the last fifty years yet economic development has remained to be un seen. In many countries absolute poverty has increased and life expectancy has declined.
Karol Boudreaux and Paul Aligica argue that the results of traditional approaches to development policy have been disappointing. Instead, the focus needs to be on the adoption of sound political and legal institutions. In particular, clearly defined and enforced private property rights are needed to encourage entrepreneurship and economic growth. However, institutional environments in Africa are both complex and challenging, and the creation of secure property rights is far from a straightforward process.
The authors examine several case studies of property rights reform in the developing world and suggest that universal policies applied regardless of local culture and tradition tend to fail. Reforms are more likely to succeed when they evolve gradually and are tailored to local norms and values rather than imposed from above by governments, aid agencies and supranational institutions.
So basically the countries who no one wanted or was most undesirable actually became the most advanced and economically stable but the down side is the equality is no where near where it should be.