Clinton and Gays in the Military At a 1991 campaign stop at Harvard University’s john F. Kennedy School of Government, presidential candidate Bill Clinton indicated that if elected he would lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. Clinton’s statement was made in response to a student’s question, and according to Clinton, was offered without prior consultation with campaign aides or consideration of the broader issues involved. Nevertheless, that promise soon became a staple on the campaign trail. The potentially explosive nature of Clinton’s campaign promise generated remarkably little negative publicity during the postconvention-phase of the campaign. All of that changed shortly after the election. During the transition, members of the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) worked through retired Admiral William Crowe, who publicly supported Clinton during the campaign but opposed lifting the ban, and Representative Dave McCurdy to try to convince Clinton not to act on his campaign promise. Reportedly, they urged Clinton to appoint a presi- dential commission to examine the issue over a one— or two—year period.
The tone of these discussions Was not conducive to compromise. Clinton’s transition team placed John Holum, .a Washington lawyer, in charge of preparing a plan for lifting the ban. Holum’s position was that he “wasn’t there to ask whether it should be done . . . [but] how it could be done to minimize the impact on combat effectiveness.” (Holum’s report was finished in early January and sent to Little Rock for Clinton to read. It contained warn- ings by two of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s advisers of the danger that lay
Clinton and Gays in the Military At a 1991 campaign stop at Harvard University’s john F. Kennedy School of Government, presidential candidate Bill Clinton indicated that if elected he would lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. Clinton’s statement was made in response to a student’s question, and according to Clinton, was offered without prior consultation with campaign aides or consideration of the broader issues involved. Nevertheless, that promise soon became a staple on the campaign trail. The potentially explosive nature of Clinton’s campaign promise generated remarkably little negative publicity during the postconvention-phase of the campaign. All of that changed shortly after the election. During the transition, members of the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) worked through retired Admiral William Crowe, who publicly supported Clinton during the campaign but opposed lifting the ban, and Representative Dave McCurdy to try to convince Clinton not to act on his campaign promise. Reportedly, they urged Clinton to appoint a presi- dential commission to examine the issue over a one— or two—year period. The tone of these discussions Was not conducive to compromise. Clinton’s transition team placed John Holum, .a Washington lawyer, in charge of preparing a plan for lifting the ban. Holum’s position was that he “wasn’t there to ask whether it should be done . . . [but] how it could be done to minimize the impact on combat effectiveness.” (Holum’s report was finished in early January and sent to Little Rock for Clinton to read. It contained warn- ings by two of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s advisers of the danger that lay
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