Criticism of the United States for inflexibility grew during the fall of 2003. In October, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Bangkok, Thailand, Bush signaled a softening of his strident position, stating that the United States would sign a document pledging not to attack the DPRK. His new approach, Lee and Moon observe, ignored the reality that negotiation of a settlement was possible “only if North Korea [felt] that the outside world [was] there to help the regime, not destroy it.” Proof of this flaw came in February 2004 at the second Six-Power meeting, when the U.S. delegation rejected the DPRK’s offer to freeze its nuclear program in return for large amounts of economic aid. The United States stood alone in opposing any concessions prior to verification of complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Pyongyang refused to comply with this demand and the session adjourned. Thereafter, escalating international criticism of U.S. obduracy increased pressure on the Bush administration to adopt a more conciliatory approach. At that time, the Bush administration had less leverage after shifting 12,000 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq, while moving remaining forces in the ROK away from the DMZ. Another factor motivating the United States to table a new initiative was the desire to remove the Korean impasse as an issue in Bush’s reelection campaign. Also, in June, Prime Minister Koizumi at the G-8 summit meeting had made a personal appeal for compromise.82