But Menger not only shows that methodological inductivist essentialism has to be rejected because the theory of subjective evaluations loses its methodological import if is combined wiht that position also shows that the inductivist views of the authors of the German Historical school need to be rejected on logical and on epistemological grounds. Yet Menger is an inductivist and defends the usual link of empirisim as an epistemological position and of induction as method of inferring strictly universal and empirical statements, or as Menger calls them strict or exact laws. However, Menger is well aware that his logical objection against the naїve inductivist view of the German authors renders the inference of strictly universal and empirical statements impossible.It triggers a conflict between the methodological requirements of strict universality and empirism defining empirical science.Yet in Menger's view, the statements or theories which the theoretical social sciences propose claim to be valid independent of time and error and are emprical: they are strictly universal and the foundation of their truth value is experience.The method of induction seemingly shows the possibility of fulfilling both requirements simultaneously, since it allows content-enlarging and thuth-preserving inferences.Strictly universal statements or theories which are empirical transcend experience; but experience remains the foundation of their truth value if it is possible to reduce them logically to singular describing observations or personal experiences. However, Menger’s own logical argument directed against the position of the German Historical School that past experience can for logical reasons only establish empirical statements which are only numerically but not strictly general seems to reject his inductivist and empirical position as well. If empirical statements are summaries of past observation only the methodological requirement of empirism is satisfied but the claim that they also are strictly universal has to be rejected.
The contrast of empirism, according o which the foundation of the truth value of singular and strictly universal statements is experience and of strict universality according to which the statements which theoretical science proposes are strictly universal and empirical is triggered by the logical objection to content-enlarging and truth-preserving inferences. This is the so-called problem of induction and since Menger threatens his own empirical and inductivist position by providing an argument against the validity of inductive inferences, he attempts to solve that problem.