than a thousand viewings, the latter on more than thirty.22 On a mere dozen viewings, I am in complete agreement, and Gaut’s claim that Memento is “one of the most narratively complex artworks ever produced” is no exaggeration.23
Gaut fails to demonstrate the operation of narration confirmation for (2).24 The impaired memory of the protagonist, Leonard (Guy Pearce), is indeed explained by his aims, which, de- pending on one’s interpretation of the film, are (a) his genuine—albeit flawed—attempts to avenge his wife’s murder, (b) his use of his wife’s murder by others as an excuse to indulge his own love of killing, or (c) his attempts to repress his memory of murdering his wife himself. There is no strong parallel between fiction and reality here, as the viewer is simply trying to make sense of the narrative. Even though there is evidence for all three interpretations, the viewer has no vested interest in a particular interpretation to the extent that this interest determines one’s memory of events in any way comparable to Leonard’s self-manipulation in the film. What is interesting about Gaut’s failure to show (2) is that it shows the strength of (1) and (3); that is, (2) shows the real difference between deriving a proposition from the evidence offered by a film (memory is partly determined by one’s aims) and experiencing the narrational confirmation of a proposition (memory is unreliable).
The narrational confirmation of (3) is paradigmatic. Leonard has a severe case of anterograde amnesia, and the narration of the film is such that the color scenes are shown in reverse or- der; that is, the viewer does not know what has happened immediately prior to the events de- picted. Gaut claims that Memento forces epis- temic identification with Leonard on the viewer by placing her in a similar epistemic situation and that this epistemic identification results in a more powerful affective identification (imagin- ing what Leonard is feeling) and empathy (feeling what Leonard is feeling).25 The similarity of the septicemic situations of Leonard and the viewer provides narration confirmation of the importance of memory to understanding because “we not only grasp that Leonard cannot inter- pret the situation correctly because of his in- capacity, but we are also made to experience through the narration strategy that we cannot grasp the situation correctly if we are deprived of the information that memory would normally provide.”26
Gaut concludes that narration confirmation is “partial confirmation” and “a kind of experiential confirmation.”27 The latter term refers to the fact that a work of film can provide a particular experience for a viewer. In the case of Memento, it is the narration which facilitates the viewer’s experience of (1) memory as unreliable and (3) memory as essential to understanding. According to Gaut, therefore, the experience of watching the film is an experience which confirms (1) and (3): “Narrational confirmation is a real phenomenon, and it is one whose existence is disclosed by detailed attention to Memento.”28 I shall employ the term
‘experiential confirmation’ as opposed to partial or narrational confirmation, and I take Gaut to have demonstrated that: Memento provides experiential confirmation of the cognitive claims about the actual world that are explicit or implicit in the work. I shall now show that Gaut’s claim is in fact too weak, and that Memento provides more than experiential confirmation of (1) and (3).
Gaut’s use of the word ‘confirmation’ implies that the assertions in (1) and (3) are already known to him; that is, the knowledge they yield is not new. The absence of innovation is not a cinematic feature of Memento, however, because it has potential application to all means by which philosophical knowledge is communicated. As Smuts has pointed out, relatively few contributions to philosophy are innovative in “the strong sense of the term.”29 The question of whether a particular method is capable of presenting new ideas or is re- stricted to the illustration of preexisting ideas can therefore be asked of all means of philosophical communication, including, for example, thought experiments. In her defenses of thought experiments as indispensable tools in science and phi- losophy, Tamar Gendler discusses (a) the thought experiment Galileo employed to refute Aristotle’s claim that natural speed is directly proportional to weight.30 Gendler introduces an example of her own invention:
[b] Think about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the following questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash with the current carpet, or complement it? If you removed all its furniture, could four elephants fit comfortably inside? If you removed all but one of the elephants, would there be enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as you turned?31
than a thousand viewings, the latter on more than thirty.22 On a mere dozen viewings, I am in complete agreement, and Gaut’s claim that Memento is “one of the most narratively complex artworks ever produced” is no exaggeration.23
Gaut fails to demonstrate the operation of narration confirmation for (2).24 The impaired memory of the protagonist, Leonard (Guy Pearce), is indeed explained by his aims, which, de- pending on one’s interpretation of the film, are (a) his genuine—albeit flawed—attempts to avenge his wife’s murder, (b) his use of his wife’s murder by others as an excuse to indulge his own love of killing, or (c) his attempts to repress his memory of murdering his wife himself. There is no strong parallel between fiction and reality here, as the viewer is simply trying to make sense of the narrative. Even though there is evidence for all three interpretations, the viewer has no vested interest in a particular interpretation to the extent that this interest determines one’s memory of events in any way comparable to Leonard’s self-manipulation in the film. What is interesting about Gaut’s failure to show (2) is that it shows the strength of (1) and (3); that is, (2) shows the real difference between deriving a proposition from the evidence offered by a film (memory is partly determined by one’s aims) and experiencing the narrational confirmation of a proposition (memory is unreliable).
The narrational confirmation of (3) is paradigmatic. Leonard has a severe case of anterograde amnesia, and the narration of the film is such that the color scenes are shown in reverse or- der; that is, the viewer does not know what has happened immediately prior to the events de- picted. Gaut claims that Memento forces epis- temic identification with Leonard on the viewer by placing her in a similar epistemic situation and that this epistemic identification results in a more powerful affective identification (imagin- ing what Leonard is feeling) and empathy (feeling what Leonard is feeling).25 The similarity of the septicemic situations of Leonard and the viewer provides narration confirmation of the importance of memory to understanding because “we not only grasp that Leonard cannot inter- pret the situation correctly because of his in- capacity, but we are also made to experience through the narration strategy that we cannot grasp the situation correctly if we are deprived of the information that memory would normally provide.”26
Gaut concludes that narration confirmation is “partial confirmation” and “a kind of experiential confirmation.”27 The latter term refers to the fact that a work of film can provide a particular experience for a viewer. In the case of Memento, it is the narration which facilitates the viewer’s experience of (1) memory as unreliable and (3) memory as essential to understanding. According to Gaut, therefore, the experience of watching the film is an experience which confirms (1) and (3): “Narrational confirmation is a real phenomenon, and it is one whose existence is disclosed by detailed attention to Memento.”28 I shall employ the term
‘experiential confirmation’ as opposed to partial or narrational confirmation, and I take Gaut to have demonstrated that: Memento provides experiential confirmation of the cognitive claims about the actual world that are explicit or implicit in the work. I shall now show that Gaut’s claim is in fact too weak, and that Memento provides more than experiential confirmation of (1) and (3).
Gaut’s use of the word ‘confirmation’ implies that the assertions in (1) and (3) are already known to him; that is, the knowledge they yield is not new. The absence of innovation is not a cinematic feature of Memento, however, because it has potential application to all means by which philosophical knowledge is communicated. As Smuts has pointed out, relatively few contributions to philosophy are innovative in “the strong sense of the term.”29 The question of whether a particular method is capable of presenting new ideas or is re- stricted to the illustration of preexisting ideas can therefore be asked of all means of philosophical communication, including, for example, thought experiments. In her defenses of thought experiments as indispensable tools in science and phi- losophy, Tamar Gendler discusses (a) the thought experiment Galileo employed to refute Aristotle’s claim that natural speed is directly proportional to weight.30 Gendler introduces an example of her own invention:
[b] Think about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the following questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash with the current carpet, or complement it? If you removed all its furniture, could four elephants fit comfortably inside? If you removed all but one of the elephants, would there be enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as you turned?31
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
