There is a striking formal analogy between the institution of the
podesteria and the practice of lot, even though the podesta was elected
and not selected by lot. The common element is that in both cases
recourse was made to something external and neutral to overcome
factional strife. In the Italian cities, the crucial property of lot
appears to have been that it shifted the allocation of offices to a
procedure that was not subject to human influence. On the one hand, an outcome determined by lot was more acceptable to
conflicting factions on account of its conspicuous impartiality. On
the other hand, placing the decision beyond reach prevented the
divisive effects of open competition among factions. The practice of
sortition and the institution of the podesteria can thus be seen as
variations on a common theme: the peacekeeping potential of
externality. In any case, that the use of lot came to be seen as a
solution to the problem of factions (whether or not it was introduced
for that reason) is borne out by the following comment by Leonardo
Bruni on the introduction of lot in fourteenth-century Florence:
''Experience has shown that this practice [selection of magistrates by
lot] was useful in eliminating the struggles that so frequently
erupted among the citizens competing for election Bruni
continues, in the same passage of his Histories of the Florentine People
(1415-21), by criticizing the use of lot, because when citizens must
compete for election and "openly put their reputation on the line,"
they have an incentive to conduct themselves well. This incentive is
of course removed when office-holders are selected by lot, and
Bruni deplores the absence of this incentive. But his ultimate
opposition to the use of sortition serves to underscore the principal
merit he recognizes in this practice.
There is a striking formal analogy between the institution of the
podesteria and the practice of lot, even though the podesta was elected
and not selected by lot. The common element is that in both cases
recourse was made to something external and neutral to overcome
factional strife. In the Italian cities, the crucial property of lot
appears to have been that it shifted the allocation of offices to a
procedure that was not subject to human influence. On the one hand, an outcome determined by lot was more acceptable to
conflicting factions on account of its conspicuous impartiality. On
the other hand, placing the decision beyond reach prevented the
divisive effects of open competition among factions. The practice of
sortition and the institution of the podesteria can thus be seen as
variations on a common theme: the peacekeeping potential of
externality. In any case, that the use of lot came to be seen as a
solution to the problem of factions (whether or not it was introduced
for that reason) is borne out by the following comment by Leonardo
Bruni on the introduction of lot in fourteenth-century Florence:
''Experience has shown that this practice [selection of magistrates by
lot] was useful in eliminating the struggles that so frequently
erupted among the citizens competing for election Bruni
continues, in the same passage of his Histories of the Florentine People
(1415-21), by criticizing the use of lot, because when citizens must
compete for election and "openly put their reputation on the line,"
they have an incentive to conduct themselves well. This incentive is
of course removed when office-holders are selected by lot, and
Bruni deplores the absence of this incentive. But his ultimate
opposition to the use of sortition serves to underscore the principal
merit he recognizes in this practice.
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