terms of conflict between two profoundly divided and opposing camps for ultimate political control the red-shirted supporters of Thaksin and those who back the country's "network monarchy, a term coined by Duncan McCargo referring to a loose alliance of the palace, the military, and the Democrat Party led by former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva.
Throughout the crisis, the United States and China have undertaken what is seen as a fierce competition for influence in Thailand. Thai Government spokesman Pantan Wattanayagom stated in 2010
Our interests and international relations are becoming more complex. We see advantages in the competition between superpowers. The United States has high stakes in Thailand and actively pursues it interests. China is less active and uses an indirect approach and its handling of this situation was no different. China-Thailand ties are becoming more and more dynamic and China is very pragmatic, but very keen in getting information and reacting
Shawn Crispin suggested that the United States and China have been pursuing two different approaches: whereas China practiced a more pragmatic diplomacy, the United States chose an interventionist approach that has occasionally irked the traditional elite in Bangkok" To protect the country's autonomy as much as their own interests from the potential intervention of the United States in domestic politics, Thai leaders have moved closer to China. The idea is to counterbalance America's dominant role. Nonetheless, Thai leaders have been careful not to damage the country's traditional status as a 'permanent friend, of the United States. Thus, they have been cautious not to be viewed as adopting an overly hostile attitude toward the United States even when they disapproved of the American diplomatic style. This course highlighted a conventional Thai strategy of engineering a foreign policy that is less reliant on one single Power, which would restrain their diplomatic freedom.
Beijing's soft power illustrates its resilience in the Thai crisis in which China has gained a great deal of trust and respect from Bangkok. This trust is translated into even more cordial economic and military relations between Thailand and China. As a result of their FTA, total exports from Thailand to China have risen from US$11.8 billion in 2006 to US$16.2 billion in 2008; at the same time, imports from China grew from US$13.6 billion to US$20.1 billion. These figures reflect Thailand's trade deficit vis-a-vis China, registered at US$1.8 billion in 2006 and US$3.9 billion in 2008
In the military field, the first Sino-Thai joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Thailand took place in 2005 as an equivalent military exercise, albeit on a much smaller scale, to the American' Cobra Gold. Not only have these joint naval exercises been designed to cement military links between the two countries, they have served to erase the image of a Chinese-threat in the eyes of the Thai leaders, and they have acted to undermine traditional United States-Thai strategic ties under- pinned by a supposed common enemy. In an interview with the Asia Times, China's ambassador to Bangkok, Guan Mu, who speaks Thai fluently and has served in Thailand for 18 years in different capacities, underscored his country's strategy of befriending Thailand by avoiding interference in its domestic problem, It is apparent that China has been ramping up economic and cultural diplomacy, all encapsulated within a discourse of Chinese soft power, which is more relevant and attuned to Thailand's future interests than the United States, still strong emphasis on security issues.
The United States, on the contrary, has frequently intervened in Thailand's domestic politics, throughout both the Cold War era and in the present period. In an attempt to influence Thailand's domestic policy and dictate the behavior of certain political actors in the current crisis, Washington has managed to peeve both sides of Thailand's political divide. It was reported that United States