This paperexaminesthedemandfordisclosurerulesbyinformedmanagersinterestedin
increasingthemarketpriceoftheirfirms.Withinamodelofpoliticalinfluence,a majority
of managerschoosesdisclosureruleswithwhich all firms mustcomply.Inequilibrium,
disclosurerulesareasymmetricwithgreaterlevelsofdisclosureoveradverseevents.
This asymmetryispositivelyassociatedwiththeinformativenessofthemeasurementand
increasinginthelevelofverifiabilityandex-anteuncertaintyoftheinformation.The
theoryalsooffersimplicationsabouttherelationbetweenmandatoryandvoluntary
disclosure,whenbothchannelsareendogenous.
& 2014TheAuthors.PublishedbyElsevierB.V.ThisisanopenaccessarticleundertheCC
BY-NC-NDlicense(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).