may will, it is enough for it to will. Every form is good, and its will is always
the supreme law. Since, in conceiving of a legitimate society, we
have supposed that every purely natural, individual will has the moral
power to form an association, how can we deny that power to an equally
natural, common will? A nation never leaves the state of nature and, amidst
so many perils, it can never have too many possible ways of expressing its
will. There is no reason to be afraid of repeating the fact that a nation is
independent of all forms and, however it may will, it is enough for its will
to be made known for all positive law to fall silent in its presence, because
it is the source and supreme master of all positive law.
Although they do not need further proof, there is an even stronger
proof of the truth of these principles.
A nation should not and cannot subject itself to constitutional forms because,
at the first conflict between the various parts of its constitution, what
would become of a nation so disposed and so ordered as to be unable to act
in any other way than through the provisions of the disputed constitution?
It is worth emphasizing how essential it is in the civil order for citizens to
find a branch of the active power readily able to exercise authority to settle
their legal differences. In the same way, among a free people the various
branches of the active power must have the freedom to appeal to the legislature
for a decision in every unforeseen difficulty. But if the legislature itself
or the various parts of this primary element of the constitution cannot
agree among themselves, who is to be the supreme judge? There is always
a need for one because, without one, order will give way to anarchy.
How can it be imagined that a constituted body can decide upon its
constitution? One or several of the component parts of a moral body are
nothing when taken separately. Power belongs solely to the whole. As
soon as a part objects, the whole no longer exists, and if it no longer exists,
how can it judge?30 Thus it ought to be recognized that there would
no longer be a constitution if, at the slightest dispute between its component
parts, the nation did not have an existence independent of all procedural
rules and constitutional forms.
In the light of these observations, it should now be possible to answer
the question we posed. It is clear that that the various parts of what you
take to be the French constitution are not in agreement. Who then is entitled
to decide? It must be the Nation, independent as it necessarily is of