In contrast, most psychologists and neuroscientists are materialists and believe that minds are
brains: the mind is what the brain does. General acceptance of this view would amount to the most
radical conceptual revolution in the history of human thinking. Previously, the two most sweeping
scientific revolutions were Copernicus's rejection of Ptolemy's view that the earth is the center of the
universe, and Darwin's rejection of the religious view that humans were specially created by God.
According to modern astronomy, the earth is just another planet circling the sun, which is just one of
billions of stars in billions of galaxies. According to Darwin, humans are just another biological
species evolved through natural selection. The Brain Revolution now in progress is even more
threatening to humans' natural desire to think of ourselves as special, for it implies that our treasured
thoughts and feelings are just another biological process. Unsurprisingly, even some nonreligious
thinkers find disturbing the view that minds are brains, despite mounting evidence for such
identification. Not only immortality but also highly compelling doctrines of free will and moral
responsibility have been tied to the idea of minds as souls. The lure of dualism is powerful.
This chapter will argue that the hypothesis that minds are brains has far more explanatory power
than does its main competing hypothesis that minds are souls. Later I will also consider two
prominent materialist views that resist identifying minds with brains: the functionalist view that minds
can be processes in many different physical systems, and the embodiment view that minds are states
of the whole body. I think that neither of these views contradicts my main claim that human minds are
brains, which is, however, radically incompatible with the commonsense view that minds are not
physical objects.
In contrast, most psychologists and neuroscientists are materialists and believe that minds arebrains: the mind is what the brain does. General acceptance of this view would amount to the mostradical conceptual revolution in the history of human thinking. Previously, the two most sweepingscientific revolutions were Copernicus's rejection of Ptolemy's view that the earth is the center of theuniverse, and Darwin's rejection of the religious view that humans were specially created by God.According to modern astronomy, the earth is just another planet circling the sun, which is just one ofbillions of stars in billions of galaxies. According to Darwin, humans are just another biologicalspecies evolved through natural selection. The Brain Revolution now in progress is even morethreatening to humans' natural desire to think of ourselves as special, for it implies that our treasuredthoughts and feelings are just another biological process. Unsurprisingly, even some nonreligiousthinkers find disturbing the view that minds are brains, despite mounting evidence for suchidentification. Not only immortality but also highly compelling doctrines of free will and moralresponsibility have been tied to the idea of minds as souls. The lure of dualism is powerful.This chapter will argue that the hypothesis that minds are brains has far more explanatory powerthan does its main competing hypothesis that minds are souls. Later I will also consider twoprominent materialist views that resist identifying minds with brains: the functionalist view that mindscan be processes in many different physical systems, and the embodiment view that minds are statesof the whole body. I think that neither of these views contradicts my main claim that human minds arebrains, which is, however, radically incompatible with the commonsense view that minds are notphysical objects.
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In contrast, most psychologists and neuroscientists are materialists and believe that minds are
brains: the mind is what the brain does. General acceptance of this view would amount to the most
radical conceptual revolution in the history of human thinking. Previously, the two most sweeping
scientific revolutions were Copernicus's rejection of Ptolemy's view that the earth is the center of the
universe, and Darwin's rejection of the religious view that humans were specially created by God.
According to modern astronomy, the earth is just another planet circling the sun, which is just one of
billions of stars in billions of galaxies. According to Darwin, humans are just another biological
species evolved through natural selection. The Brain Revolution now in progress is even more
threatening to humans' natural desire to think of ourselves as special, for it implies that our treasured
thoughts and feelings are just another biological process. Unsurprisingly, even some nonreligious
thinkers find disturbing the view that minds are brains, despite mounting evidence for such
identification. Not only immortality but also highly compelling doctrines of free will and moral
responsibility have been tied to the idea of minds as souls. The lure of dualism is powerful.
This chapter will argue that the hypothesis that minds are brains has far more explanatory power
than does its main competing hypothesis that minds are souls. Later I will also consider two
prominent materialist views that resist identifying minds with brains: the functionalist view that minds
can be processes in many different physical systems, and the embodiment view that minds are states
of the whole body. I think that neither of these views contradicts my main claim that human minds are
brains, which is, however, radically incompatible with the commonsense view that minds are not
physical objects.
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