The Modern State
CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS
Modern political philosophy takes its principal object of study to be to the state. How to understand it? What is its justification? It is hard to teach a coursein modern political philosophy that does not focus on the state-it is what preoccupies Hobbes,Locke,Rousseau,and Hegel-and a discussion of contemporary political theory cannot ignore it. While few political thinkers today go so far as to accept Hegel’s conception of political science which would have us ‘attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently rational entity’(1821:21).most take the state to be the central feature of the political landscape and the task of determining its justification to be central to political philosophy. A few thinkers question our acceptance of the state and take seriously the challenge of anarchism, but most think state in some form or another are justifiable.
It is hard to ignore the state or government-You may not be interested in the state , but the state ‘is certainly interested in you’ , to adapt Trotsky’s quip about war. Almost wherever we find ourselves today we find government .Some have urged that the state be kept out of our lives, or at least our bedrooms, but to little avail. The state is omnipresent .
States appear as much in our dreams and nightmares as in our lives. Movements of ‘national liberation’ typically aspire to a state of their own ; secessionist seek independence in order to found a new state . Only states are accorded the privilege of a seat at the (misnamed) United Nations. The European Union is feared by some lest it become a super state, just as the United Nations was opposed long ago by opponents of ‘world government’. Those sceptical about the possibility of world government often conclude that international affairs must be anarchic in the absence of a world state , as if state and anarchy exhaust the possibilities [see future Chapter 22]
It may be hard to ignore the state , and as theorists of politics we cannot do so . But does it deserve the central place it has been given in our thought and action? Might anarchists be right in thinking that we can do without the state or that it is not justified? Is the only alternative to the current system of states word government or a single suprastate?
To answer question like these we need to know more about what we are talking about in the first place. Casual reference to ‘the state’ may suggest that we are relatively clear about the object of our inquiry. But this may be an illusion as it turns out to be very difficult to determine what exactly it is that we are talking about when referring to ‘the state’
WHAT IS THE STATE?
At an early stage in most discussion of the state a ‘definition’ is trotted out. Most often is an abbreviated version of Max Weber’s well-known characterization of the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (1919:78). Weber says that ‘the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the “right” to use violence. ’
This oft-cited definition, however , is problematic for a number of reasons. In the section that follows I shall question the centrality it accords to force and correction. The first thing to note about it now is its simplicity. A human community is a state if and only if it successfully claims to possess two thing : a monopoly of force and the sole right to determine who may legitimately use force. Could an organized criminal organization or one of Nozick’s protective agencies be a state ? One might have thought something more would be required . States are rather large and complex sorts of thing, with legal systems, administrative agencies, and a number of other important features. In fact Weber himself, as one might expect , thought there was much more to the matter. Elsewhere he offered a much more complete characterization.
Since the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full development. It is best to define it in terms appropriate to the modern type of statue , but at the same time , in terms which abstract from the values of the present day, since these are particularly subject to change. The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follow: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens… but also to a very large extent, over all actions talking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it.(1947:156)
A number of additional features or attributes are singled out by Webber in this passage : the existence of an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, maintained by a substantial administrative staff, itself regulated by legislation, a claim to ‘binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens… but also to a very large extent, over all actions talking place in the area of its jurisdiction…a compulsory association with a territorial basis’.
Simple definitions like the one customarily attributed to Weber are inadequate ; at the very least they require supplementation. I shall argue later that these definition make force or coercion too central and draw our attention away from other important features. What are some of the other features of states ?
A theme of this chapter is that political theorists take states too much for granted. The world was not always organized as a system of states, and it is helpful to recall the ways the world was before the development of states. We can appreciate better the nature of states by contrasting them with the orders they replaced. As states originate in early modern Europe, the contrast that is most revealing is the world of late medieval Europe [see further Chapter 25].
Philosophers raised on a diet of classical Greek and modern philosophy, without much attention to the long period of thought that lies between the two, often assume that the discussions and concerns of Hobbes and other early modern political theorists are continuous with the work of Greek and Roman thinkers. There is some continuity, of course , and the works of the latter were certainly used by late medieval and early modern theorists, as well as developers, of the state. But it is a mistake to identify the Greek polis and the Roman civitas with our modern state as if nothing had changed. There are some structural resemblances, but significant differences. Although certain features of the poils and of Roman law were adapted to late medieval and early modern governance, the Greek poleis and the Empire had disappeared by the time modern states were emerging. The historical context for the emergence of the modern European state has only traces of the classical world of Greece and Rome. The distinctiveness of the modern state is almost noticeable when contrasted with the complex forms of political organization of medieval Europe.
‘Europe’ from the end of the Roman Empire to the end of the feudal period or the thirteenth century was a complicated social order in which political power is decentralized and highly fragmented. Political relations between people were multifaceted, allegiances varied and overlapping, and the resulting political orders complex. Social order was not secured by centralized hierarchical institutions, as in our societies ; power and authority were decentralized. Broadly speaking, medieval Europe consisted of complex, crosscutting jurisdictions of towns, lords, kings, emperors, popes and bishops. While all were unified as part of Christendom power was fragmented and shared by many different parties, allegiances were multiple, and there was no clearly defined hierarchy of authority. Allegiances could, and frequently did, overlap. Different lords, monarchs, and emperors could each have some claim over someone, and bishops and popes as well. Governance was typically mediated. No single agency controlled, or could possibly control, political life in the ways now routine for modern states. Given the largely customary nature of law, there is no single legal system, with an unambiguous hierarchy of juridical authorities. Several features are important to note. Not only was power fragmented and control of territory denied any one group or institution, but relations of authority overlapped and were not exclusive , and no clear hierarchy was discernible. In addition, feudal rule was essentially personal. Rule was based on particular (voluntary or involuntary) relations between individuals , governance was essentially over people rather than land, and power was treated as a private possession: ‘It can be divided among heirs, given as a marriage portion, mortgaged, bought and sold. Private contract and the rules of family law determine the possessors of judicial and administrative authority’(strayer, 1965:12). Relations between particular persons, many essentially promissory, laid the basis for the complex obligations between lords and vassals. Governance was not territorial. It is not so much that control of particular geographical areas was incomplete or insecure (though this was the case), it is that allegiances were not territorially determined: ‘[I]nclusion in the feudal structure was not defined by physical location … One’s specific obligations or rights depended on one’s place in the matrix of personal ties, not on one’s location
รัฐสมัยใหม่มอร์ริส W. คริสโตเฟอร์ปรัชญาการเมืองสมัยใหม่ใช้วัตถุหลักของการศึกษาเป็นการ เข้าใจมันได้อย่างไร เหตุผลมันคืออะไร ความ coursein ที่ทันสมัยสอนปรัชญาการเมืองที่ไม่เน้นรัฐ-มันเป็นอะไร preoccupies มัสฮอบส์ ล็อก Rousseau และ Hegel- และการสนทนาของทฤษฎีทางการเมืองร่วมสมัยไม่สามารถละเว้น ขณะที่บางเมือง thinkers ไปวันนี้จนเป็นยอมรับความคิดของ Hegel คณะรัฐศาสตร์ซึ่งจะทำให้เรา ' พยายามเข้าใจ และวาดภาพสถานะเป็นเอนทิตีความเชือด '(1821:21) .most ใช้รัฐเป็น ลักษณะศูนย์กลางของภูมิทัศน์ทางการเมืองและงานกำหนดเหตุผลของการเป็นศูนย์กลางทางการเมืองปรัชญา Thinkers กี่คำถามของเรายอมรับสภาพ และใช้อย่างจริงจังความท้าทายของลัทธิอนาธิปไตย แต่ส่วนใหญ่คิดว่า สถานะในแบบฟอร์ม หรืออื่นจะแข่งขันจึงยากที่จะละเว้นรัฐหรือรัฐบาล-คุณอาจไม่สนใจในสถานะ แต่รัฐ 'เป็นแน่นอนสนใจในตัวคุณ' แผลง quip ใน Trotsky ของเกี่ยวกับสงคราม เกือบทุกที่ที่เราพบตัวเองวันนี้ เราพบรัฐบาล บางส่วนได้เรียกร้องให้ที่ รัฐเก็บไว้หมดชีวิต หรือน้อยห้อง แต่ เพื่อประโยชน์เล็ก ๆ น้อย ๆ โดยรัฐมีรตุอเมริกาปรากฏมากในความฝันและฝันร้ายในชีวิตของเรา ความเคลื่อนไหวของ 'ปลดปล่อยแห่งชาติ' โดยปกติ aspire สถานะของตนเอง ขบวนการหายากเพื่อพบสิ่งใหม่ รัฐเท่านั้นเป็นทรัพย์สิทธิ์นั่งในสหประชาชาติ (misnamed) สหภาพยุโรปเป็นกลัว ด้วยบางส่วนเกรงว่ามันกลายเป็นรัฐซูเปอร์ เหมือนสหประชาชาติถูกข้ามนาน โดยฝ่ายตรงข้ามของ "รัฐบาลโลก" เหล่านั้นความเกี่ยวกับความเป็นไปได้ของรัฐบาลโลกมักจะสรุปว่า วิเทศต้องเกี่ยวกับอนาธิปไตยของรัฐโลก เป็นถ้าสถานะและอนาธิปไตยไอไป [ดูบทในอนาคต 22]มันอาจจะยากที่จะละเว้นสถานะ และเป็น theorists เมือง ทำไม่ได้ แต่มันไม่สมควรเซ็นทรัลจะได้รับในความคิดและการกระทำของเราหรือไม่ อาจอยู่ในความคิด ที่เราสามารถทำ โดยรัฐ หรือไม่ให้อยู่ชิดได จะสำรองเฉพาะระบบปัจจุบันรัฐบาลอเมริกาคำหรือ suprastate เดียวเราต้องการทราบข้อมูลเพิ่มเติมเกี่ยวกับอะไรเราจะพูดถึงในสถานที่แรกตอบคำถามดังนี้ การอ้างอิงถึง 'รัฐ' สบาย ๆ อาจแนะนำเราค่อนข้างชัดเจนเกี่ยวกับวัตถุประสงค์ของการสอบถามของเรา แต่นี้อาจเป็นภาพลวงตาเป็นมันเปิดออกจะยากมากที่จะกำหนดว่ามันคืออะไรที่เราพูดถึงเมื่ออ้างถึง 'รัฐ' รัฐคืออะไรที่มีระยะแรก ๆ ในการสนทนาส่วนใหญ่ของรัฐ 'นิยาม' เป็น trotted ออก ส่วนใหญ่มักจะเป็นรุ่นย่อคุณสมบัติ Max แบ่งแยกรู้จักสถานะเป็น 'มนุษย์ชุมชนที่อ้างว่า ผูกขาดการใช้กฎหมายบังคับใช้จริงภายในเขตกำหนด (สำเร็จ)' (1919:78) เวเบอร์กล่าวว่า ที่ ' สิทธิในการใช้กำลังทางกายภาพเป็น ascribed สถาบันอื่น หรือ กับบุคคลเฉพาะในขอบเขตที่รัฐอนุญาตให้มัน รัฐถือเป็นแหล่งที่มาของ "สิทธิ" ในการใช้ความรุนแรงแต่เพียงผู้เดียว ’นี้ oft-อ้างนิยาม อย่างไรก็ตาม จะมีปัญหาสำหรับจำนวนของเหตุผล ในส่วนต่อไปนี้ ฉันจะถามเอกภาพนั้น accords การบังคับและการแก้ไข สิ่งแรกที่ควรทราบเกี่ยวกับมันตอนนี้คือ ความเรียบง่าย ชุมชนมนุษย์เป็นสิ่งถ้าและเดียวถ้ามันสำเร็จอ้างครอบครองสองสิ่ง: ผูกขาดของกองทัพและครอบครัวต้องกำหนดที่ถูกต้องตามกฎหมายอาจใช้บังคับ องค์กรอาชญากรรมจัดหรือของหน่วยงานป้องกันของ Nozick อาจรัฐ หนึ่งอาจมีความคิดอะไรเพิ่มเติมจะต้อง อเมริกามีขนาดใหญ่ และซับซ้อนแต่ทุกสิ่ง ระบบกฎหมาย ดูแลหน่วยงาน และจำนวนของคุณลักษณะที่สำคัญอื่น ๆ ในความเป็นจริงแบ่งแยกตัวเอง เป็นหนึ่งอาจคาดว่า คิดว่า มีมากขึ้นนั้น อื่น ๆ เขาเสนอจำแนกสมบูรณ์มากSince the concept of the state has only in modern times reached its full development. It is best to define it in terms appropriate to the modern type of statue , but at the same time , in terms which abstract from the values of the present day, since these are particularly subject to change. The primary formal characteristics of the modern state are as follow: It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens… but also to a very large extent, over all actions talking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it.(1947:156)A number of additional features or attributes are singled out by Webber in this passage : the existence of an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, maintained by a substantial administrative staff, itself regulated by legislation, a claim to ‘binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens… but also to a very large extent, over all actions talking place in the area of its jurisdiction…a compulsory association with a territorial basis’.Simple definitions like the one customarily attributed to Weber are inadequate ; at the very least they require supplementation. I shall argue later that these definition make force or coercion too central and draw our attention away from other important features. What are some of the other features of states ?A theme of this chapter is that political theorists take states too much for granted. The world was not always organized as a system of states, and it is helpful to recall the ways the world was before the development of states. We can appreciate better the nature of states by contrasting them with the orders they replaced. As states originate in early modern Europe, the contrast that is most revealing is the world of late medieval Europe [see further Chapter 25].Philosophers raised on a diet of classical Greek and modern philosophy, without much attention to the long period of thought that lies between the two, often assume that the discussions and concerns of Hobbes and other early modern political theorists are continuous with the work of Greek and Roman thinkers. There is some continuity, of course , and the works of the latter were certainly used by late medieval and early modern theorists, as well as developers, of the state. But it is a mistake to identify the Greek polis and the Roman civitas with our modern state as if nothing had changed. There are some structural resemblances, but significant differences. Although certain features of the poils and of Roman law were adapted to late medieval and early modern governance, the Greek poleis and the Empire had disappeared by the time modern states were emerging. The historical context for the emergence of the modern European state has only traces of the classical world of Greece and Rome. The distinctiveness of the modern state is almost noticeable when contrasted with the complex forms of political organization of medieval Europe.‘Europe’ from the end of the Roman Empire to the end of the feudal period or the thirteenth century was a complicated social order in which political power is decentralized and highly fragmented. Political relations between people were multifaceted, allegiances varied and overlapping, and the resulting political orders complex. Social order was not secured by centralized hierarchical institutions, as in our societies ; power and authority were decentralized. Broadly speaking, medieval Europe consisted of complex, crosscutting jurisdictions of towns, lords, kings, emperors, popes and bishops. While all were unified as part of Christendom power was fragmented and shared by many different parties, allegiances were multiple, and there was no clearly defined hierarchy of authority. Allegiances could, and frequently did, overlap. Different lords, monarchs, and emperors could each have some claim over someone, and bishops and popes as well. Governance was typically mediated. No single agency controlled, or could possibly control, political life in the ways now routine for modern states. Given the largely customary nature of law, there is no single legal system, with an unambiguous hierarchy of juridical authorities. Several features are important to note. Not only was power fragmented and control of territory denied any one group or institution, but relations of authority overlapped and were not exclusive , and no clear hierarchy was discernible. In addition, feudal rule was essentially personal. Rule was based on particular (voluntary or involuntary) relations between individuals , governance was essentially over people rather than land, and power was treated as a private possession: ‘It can be divided among heirs, given as a marriage portion, mortgaged, bought and sold. Private contract and the rules of family law determine the possessors of judicial and administrative authority’(strayer, 1965:12). Relations between particular persons, many essentially promissory, laid the basis for the complex obligations between lords and vassals. Governance was not territorial. It is not so much that control of particular geographical areas was incomplete or insecure (though this was the case), it is that allegiances were not territorially determined: ‘[I]nclusion in the feudal structure was not defined by physical location … One’s specific obligations or rights depended on one’s place in the matrix of personal ties, not on one’s location
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