Pointing to something as an agent’s reason does not thereby establish the
cited element as what explains the belief or action, even if this accords with
the agent’s own honestly offered reason. The seemingly evident reason may
have been only a partial factor in leading to the belief or action, and possibly
not a contributing factor at all if the agent was systematically unaware of his
or her own real motivation (Aronovitch 1978). Hence, as Weber states (1978 1:9),
the proffered reason, which is to say the interpretation of the agent’s situation
whether by an observer or by the agent, is only a hypothesis concerning what
brings about the belief or action. Additional empirical evidence is needed to
establish that it actually has operative force, that it brought about the belief or
action. What is needed is determining factually whether the reason, in contrast
to some other potential factor, caused the belief or action (cf. Davidson
2001). Introducing causality in this way does not derogate from the worth of
reasons but rather can serve to confirm that they are—if indeed they are—the
operative factors as opposed to idle or ineffective ones. Weber offers, in effect,
a way out of the so-called hermeneutic circle, the circle whereby data that are
selectively interpreted and a coherent story about them each reinforce each other
without an independent basis for testing whether that combination corresponds
to anything that actually occurs. Where agents’ reasons are idle or are not operative
in the way the agents intend, other factors as causes must be uncovered
to explain the beliefs and actions, such as fears, pressures, interests or
the like. Together with bringing out that the agent’s reasons are ineffective,
these other factors will show how the agent’s grasp of the situation is incomplete
or erroneous.
Pointing to something as an agent’s reason does not thereby establish the
cited element as what explains the belief or action, even if this accords with
the agent’s own honestly offered reason. The seemingly evident reason may
have been only a partial factor in leading to the belief or action, and possibly
not a contributing factor at all if the agent was systematically unaware of his
or her own real motivation (Aronovitch 1978). Hence, as Weber states (1978 1:9),
the proffered reason, which is to say the interpretation of the agent’s situation
whether by an observer or by the agent, is only a hypothesis concerning what
brings about the belief or action. Additional empirical evidence is needed to
establish that it actually has operative force, that it brought about the belief or
action. What is needed is determining factually whether the reason, in contrast
to some other potential factor, caused the belief or action (cf. Davidson
2001). Introducing causality in this way does not derogate from the worth of
reasons but rather can serve to confirm that they are—if indeed they are—the
operative factors as opposed to idle or ineffective ones. Weber offers, in effect,
a way out of the so-called hermeneutic circle, the circle whereby data that are
selectively interpreted and a coherent story about them each reinforce each other
without an independent basis for testing whether that combination corresponds
to anything that actually occurs. Where agents’ reasons are idle or are not operative
in the way the agents intend, other factors as causes must be uncovered
to explain the beliefs and actions, such as fears, pressures, interests or
the like. Together with bringing out that the agent’s reasons are ineffective,
these other factors will show how the agent’s grasp of the situation is incomplete
or erroneous.
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