Reflections on the Establishment of the PCAOB and Its Audit Standard-Setting Role
Douglas R. Carmichael
Douglas R. Carmichael is a Professor at Baruch College–CUNY.
Corresponding author: Douglas R. Carmichael, Email: Douglas.Carmichael@baruch.cuny.edu
The opinions expressed are my own and reflect my perception of the events and circumstances that affected the PCAOB's actions and do not necessarily reflect the views of current or former PCAOB members or staff.
SYNOPSIS
This is an essay on the causes of the establishment of the PCAOB as the U.S. regulator of auditors of the financial statements of public companies, and the key developments in its role as a professional standard setter. From its inception in the U.S., the accounting profession was largely self-regulated. There was a degree of governmental regulation by state licensing laws, and the SEC's regulation of the offering and trading of securities of public companies. The federal securities laws gave the SEC direct authority over accounting standards, and indirect authority over auditing requirements through its ability to specify the form of audit reports. The SEC, however, looked primarily to the accounting profession to set its own standards. Some viewed the ability to set professional standards as an essential hallmark of professionalism. In 2002, that comfortable arrangement changed dramatically, and the regulation of auditors of public companies became the purview of the PCAOB.
A Decade after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Need for Ongoing Vigilance, Monitoring, and Research
Jeanette M. Franzel
Jeanette M. Franzel is a Board Member for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and a former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
Corresponding author: Jeanette M. Franzel, Email: franzelj@pcaobus.org
I am grateful for the valuable insights and comments provided during the development of this paper by Steve Kroll, Special Advisor at the PCAOB and former special Counsel to the Senate Banking Committee, and Francis “Abe” Dymond, Special Counsel at the PCAOB and former Assistant General Counsel and Assistant Director for Auditing at GAO. I also thank Joseph Carcello, Dana Hermanson, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments that resulted in improvements to the paper.
The views expressed by Ms. Franzel are her own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the PCAOB as a whole, other Board Members or staff, or the American Accounting Association.
SYNOPSIS
After more than a decade since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), it is appropriate and necessary to ask questions about the present state of audit quality and evaluate the impact and effectiveness of PCAOB's oversight programs. Written from the viewpoint of a current PCAOB Board member and former Managing Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), this paper discusses the warning signs of serious auditing problems in the years preceding the Act, and the role that the GAO played in analyzing those risks and calling for greater oversight of the accounting profession's auditing public companies. We must be vigilant and continually examine the activities of the auditing profession and the regulatory regime to ensure that audit independence and audit quality remain front and center to ensure investor protection and safeguard the public interest. Academic researchers play a key role in this system of vigilance. This paper provides views on many areas within the auditing profession that would benefit from further research and analysis, as well as opportunities for research that could be useful to the PCAOB as it considers current and future regulatory priorities.