Finally, in Part IV, I describe two concrete proposals that align with
my suggested framework: (1) empowering an independent decisionmaker
to consider offer proposals and (2) making user fees and the
required partial down payments on offers refundable. I further argue
that an alternative reform suggested by the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration—the introduction by the IRS of more aggressive
follow-up collection tactics for rejected OICs—is unlikely to succeed
because such a move would result in unproductive and dissonant
responses on the part of taxpayers.
The OIC procedure is just one discrete tool at the IRS’s disposal,
but the implications of my analysis are broad. Thinking analytically
about whether and how to operate and improve such a program
demonstrates how stakeholder dynamics can impact tax administration.
It also opens a window to the consideration of broader philosophical
issues and tensions in the area of tax collections, including
whether a taxing authority can act as an altruistic creditor toward tax
debtors, how much flexibility is necessary in our system of tax collections,
and what role forgiveness should play in the tax system