As a result, dollar-based external debt totaled $3.2 billion (B100.85 billion), so in the wake of the crisis, foreign exchange losses in December 1997 amounted to B14.46 billion (Krungthep Thurakit newspaper, 12
December 1997). Immediately after the crisis, TPI suspended construction of new petrochemical and cement plants and started negotiations for debt restructuring with 400 creditors in December 1998. Getting bogged down in conflicts with creditors, Prachai and his brothers would not yield control rights over TPI and finally decided to apply to the bankruptcy court in January 2000. TPI Polene Co., Ltd., followed suit in June (see Phu Chatkan Rai-duan, 2000b; Suehiro and Higashi [eds.], 2001, Chapter 2).
Why did TPI Group collapse after the crisis? Why could it not effectively supervise increasing external debt? Table 22 illustrates the case of TPI and its affiliated companies by focusing on their ownership structure (pyramid structure) and management structure. At a glance, we find that the three brothers—Prachai, Prathip and Pramuwan— exclusively controlled all affiliated companies as chairmen, vice-chairmen, directors- cum-executives, CEOs and presidents. The Board members of almost all of the companies under TPI’s control overlapped with Executive Committee members of each company.