2.2. Implications for the exchange rate
Our model so far has dealt exclusively with the e!ect of a loss of con"dence on the value of a single "rm. Aggregating similar "rms to create an economy-wide collapse of "rms' values is straightforward. We can also reasonably assume that foreign investors and many domestic investors care about returns in dollars. We then have the result that a fall in R, which is now a loss of con"dence about returns in dollars, can trigger a fall in "rms' values in dollars (i.e., the value of the stock market in dollar terms). Note that "rms' values could fall sharply, even if there is not much actual stealing, because the value of "rms' to outsiders is determined by expected expropriation.
But will such a collapse of "rms' values occur alongside an exchange rate collapse? Theoretically, a sharp fall in stock prices need not a!ect the exchange rate. Outside investors can choose to bring more capital into the country if, for example, they are more patient than domestic investors. The exchange rate only depreciates if the loss of con"dence about R also triggers a fall in capital in#ows or larger capital out#ows. Greenspan (1998, p. 3) explains the depreciation spiral and its spread across countries as follows: `The loss of con"dence can trigger rapid and disruptive changes in the pattern of "nance, which, in turn feeds back on exchange rates and asset prices. Moreover, investor concerns that weak- nesses revealed in one economy may be present in others that are similarly structured means that the loss of con"dence can be quickly spread to other countries.a In fact, if the foreign exchange market is forward looking, the mere prospect of a reduction in net capital in#ows should be enough to cause an immediate depreciation.
There are "ve reasons why a loss of con"dence can cause the net capital in#ow to fall and why this fall can be larger when corporate governance is weaker. First, when the expected return to outside investors is lower, investing in a country is less attractive. Outside investors receive less because the actual returns on investment projects are lower and because managers steal more. For a given level of expected risk, lower expected returns tend to reduce the netcapital in#ow to a particular country. In a full model, if investors learn that the expected return in a country is lower, while risk is unchanged or has even increased, their preference for assets in this country will be reduced. This is one reason why many global investment funds cut their positions in emerging markets in 1997}98 (see International Organization of Securities Commissions (1998)). Weaker corpo- rate governance means lower short-term expected returns or more risk or both.
Second, there are important agency-related reasons why traders who have just lost a great deal of money cannot immediately invest more in a country, even if they believe that the expected returns are high. Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) develop a model in which traders cannot persuade their "nancial backers that they should be allowed to invest more, because having lost money may indicate that the trader has bad judgment: `The seemingly perverse behav- ior of taking money away from an arbitrageur after noise trader sentiment deepens, i.e., precisely when his expected return is greatest, is a rational response to the problem of trying to infer the arbitrageur's (unobserved) ability and future opportunities jointly from past returnsa, (p. 41.) In reaction to a fall in asset prices, "nancial backers might insist that the trader cut his or her position in a country even further. Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) make this argument for hedge funds involved in arbitrage, but the same argument can be applied to large international banks lending to countries. As these investors pull their money out, the exchange rate depreciates.
Third, there could be particular institutional reasons why commercial banks refuse to roll over their loans. This might be due to regulatory rules and procedures that limit a bank's `value at riska (Cornelius, 1999). When prices fall in a market, the value-at-risk models used by international banks can generate the direct requirement that the bank reduce its exposure to that country (Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 1998.) Unless the borrower defaults when the loans are not rolled over, this constitutes a capital out#ow. Even if the borrower defaults, there will still be a reduction in new capital in#ow. The details of value-at-risk models vary, but a bigger fall in asset prices, due to worse corpo- rate governance, can plausibly trigger a larger reduction in the bank's invest- ment position in all the assets of that country.
The fourth reason that a loss of con"dence can trigger a decline in net capital in#ow is that when managers choose to steal more of the corporate cash, they might take the money outside the country. For this to happen, managers must care about their returns in foreign currency terms, perhaps because they have personal expenses in dollars or because they feel that local-currency- denominated assets, such as bank deposits, are not the right place to keep the proceeds of what they have stolen (e.g., because they want to avoid taxes.) Weaker corporate governance means that more is stolen for a given reduction in expected R, leading to more capital #ight and deeper currency depreciation.
Finally, as an important complement to the previous four explanations, there might be no safe haven for investors in local-currency-denominated assets.