Introduction Between 1997 and 1998 the currencies of Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea lost over a third of their value, while the currencies of the rest of Asia lost over one-fifth their value. This economic downturn was fueled by many variables. Pinpointing those variables may be impossible. There are however many theories as to which entities lent hands in the collapse of the Asian economies and their currencies. The fundamental issue in Asia was a liquidity problem, not a solvency problem. The debt was concentrated in short-term liabilities while reserve assets were low. Though there is evidence of weak banking systems, this was not the primary cause of the currency crisis. This problem was deeply rooted in the financial policies that have been overlooked. This paper will examine the Asian currency crisis, the extent to which the IMF may have actually worsened the problem, the explanatory power of an Under-Consumption Theory, and the effect of the crisis on the Asian environment. Finance and Liquidity leading to Crisis During the 1990’s, East Asia attracted large inflows of foreign capital, most of which were short term (Weber, 2001). These inflows were encouraged largely by weak European and Japanese econom