The financial liberalization directly contributed to the buildup in foreign capital flows,
since much of the domestic credit expansion was financed by domestic banks and other financial
institutions borrowing offshore. In Thailand, for example, the foreign liabilities of banks and
financial institutions rose from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 28% of GDP in 1995. Korean merchant
banks borrowed heavily offshore, and then lent the funds to large corporations (chaebols), which
became very heavily leveraged by 1997 (Borensztein and Lee, 1998). It is worthwhile noting,
however, that in Indonesia, credit growth in the financial sector was more modest, as Indonesian
corporations borrowed directly offshore. Nonetheless, the Indonesian corporate sector itself
became vulnerable to offshore panic, a point that was painfully proved in late 1997 when the
corporate debts were suddenly called in by foreign creditors.
The financial liberalization directly contributed to the buildup in foreign capital flows,since much of the domestic credit expansion was financed by domestic banks and other financialinstitutions borrowing offshore. In Thailand, for example, the foreign liabilities of banks andfinancial institutions rose from 5% of GDP in 1990 to 28% of GDP in 1995. Korean merchantbanks borrowed heavily offshore, and then lent the funds to large corporations (chaebols), whichbecame very heavily leveraged by 1997 (Borensztein and Lee, 1998). It is worthwhile noting,however, that in Indonesia, credit growth in the financial sector was more modest, as Indonesiancorporations borrowed directly offshore. Nonetheless, the Indonesian corporate sector itselfbecame vulnerable to offshore panic, a point that was painfully proved in late 1997 when thecorporate debts were suddenly called in by foreign creditors.
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