the conflict took up a considerable amount of time and effort by ASEAN as it sought a negotiated settlement while organizing international support against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. This was a role that was all the more important during the early stages of the conflict, when the Western players, such as Australia and France, were absent from the scene, although this would not prevent them from claiming maximum credit for the eventual settlement of the conflict through the misleadingly named “Paris Peace Agreement.” The real groundwork for the settlement had been laid in Bogor and Jakarta, rather than in Canberra and Paris. was its ability to dilute and manage, if not entirely resolve, intra-mural disputes. This success was evident from the very birth of ASEAN, which consummated the political settlement, mediated by Thailand, of the Indonesia–Malaysia/Singapore conflict (Konfrontasi) triggered by President Sukarno’s refusal to accept the legitimacy of the British-created Malaysian Federation. ASEAN in its early years was severely challenged by the Philippine–Malaysia dispute over Sabah, but the conflict paradoxically led the founding members of ASEAN to realize the importance of regional cooperation and the pacific settlement of disputes. Over the years, ASEAN members have not allowed their bilateral territorial disputes and political tensions—including those over maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand, the South China Sea, the Sulu Seas, and other areas—to cripple the organization. The Singapore–Malaysia dispute over the Pedra Branca islands in the South China Sea and the Malaysia–Indonesia dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in the Sulawesi Sea have been settled through resort to arbitration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Though the ICJ is an “outside” body, their very willingness to resort to judicial settlement rather than to violence is a testimony to the spirit of accommodation among ASEAN members.
But inter-state disputes and tensions within ASEAN have not disappeared. Neither has war become “unthinkable”—the hallmark of a “mature” security community. ASEAN’s Secretary-General has warned that “unresolved and overlapping maritime and territorial claims remain ASEAN’s biggest challenge.”
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The news is not all bad, however. Singapore–Malaysia relations have steadily improved since the end of Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew premierships, respectively; witness the recent resolution of their 20-year old railway land dispute. Indonesia and Singapore also enjoy a better political relationship than in the days when Indonesian President Habibie disparaged the city-state as a “little red dot.” But a variety of bilateral issues between Singapore and its neighbors remain to be settled. With Malaysia, they include, among others, Singapore’s access to Malaysian water and, more trivially, alleged violations of Malaysian airspace by Singapore’s air force planes. Moreover, the bilateral tensions are not strictly inter-governmental, but also inter-societal. Despite the fact that Singapore has increasingly been turning to ASEAN, it is still regarded by some of its neighbors as somewhat self-centered. The historical perception in Malaysia and Indonesia of Singapore as a wealthy Chinese island in a “sea of Malays” is a latent source of tension, and might resurface in a future economic crisis in which Singapore is perceived to be unwilling to provide unconditional aid to its neighbors (as Malaysia alleged during the 1997 economic crisis). While Singapore and Indonesia have reached agreement on their western maritime boundary, and talks are well under way to settle the eastern boundary, there have been tensions over extradition. (Indonesians feel that its corrupt businessmen find it easy to flee to or via the city state rather than face justice at home.) The pacifying effect of the ICJ-mandated settlement of the Sipadan–Ligitan island dispute has been marred by a new dispute between Singapore and Malaysia over the Malaysian claim to the nearby Ambalat. And the Pedra Branca dispute might still surface as a source of Singapore–Malaysia friction, because the ICJ settlement recognized Singapore’s sovereignty over Pedra Branca itself, but awarded the adjacent Middle Rocks to Malaysia.