3.3 The banking union as part of a better architecture
And that is an important point, because the close link between government finances and the financial system was a major element of the crisis.
Basically, this is very much a vicious circle: if public finances run into difficulties, the banks are put under strain– if the banks hold government bonds on their balance sheets, for example.
Conversely, if banks run into difficulties, public finances are put under strain. Take the example of Ireland: in order to save its banking sector, Ireland ran up a budget deficit amounting to 30% of its economic output in 2010.
There are various approaches to breaking through this vicious circle. One of them is the planned European banking union.
The banking union consists of two elements. One element is joint banking supervision for large banks, the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Joint supervision would allow banks everywhere to be supervised according to the same high standards. It would also make it possible to take better account of cross-border effects.
But all of that cannot entirely rule out the possibility of bank failure. And that is a good thing. After all, the risk of corporate failure is a core element of the market economy.
Therefore, measures have to be taken to ensure that banks can fail without placing a strain on government finances. And this is where the second element of the banking union comes into play: a single resolution and restructuring mechanism for banks. And that, too, is under development at present.
Properly equipped, the banking union is thus a key component of a stable monetary union. With the banking union, government finances will be better protected in the future against crises in the banking sector.
But we have to break through the vicious circle from another direction, too. We also have to protect banks from government finances running into difficulties.
One of the most important measures in this respect concerns banking regulation. Banks should back government bonds with capital that corresponds to their risk.
For one thing, this would strengthen the market mechanism: banks would have an incentive to demand appropriate risk premiums for government bonds. That, in turn, would be an important market signal for governments. For another, it would also create a buffer protecting banks against a government running into financial difficulties and its bonds losing value.