The big bath theory holds that companies with unusually low earnings in the current year will take large write downs to lower earnings even further. There seems to be little additional penalty for missing the earnings mark by a lot rather than by a little. The large write downs taken in the current year should improve future earnings performance as the burden has already been removed. Although the accounting literature is replete with studies on earnings management in general, there exists a paucity of empirical research specifically testing the big bath theory. However, Walsh et al. (1991) and Chenheiter and Melumad (2002) do provide evidence of its existence. The current study expands the empirical literature on big bath theory and presents additional proof that this method of earnings management is alive and well.
In 2002, SFAS No. 142 ended the decades long practice of amortizing goodwill. Instead, firms must now test goodwill annually for impairment and write down this intangible asset if necessary. Applying the impairment test requires the use of significant discretion on the part of management and presents a unique opportunity to manage earnings through big bath charges. SFAS No. 142 provided additional incentive to take big baths in 2002, the year of adoption, by stating that initial write downs taken that year would be reported as a change in accounting principle and, thus, would not affect operating results. Write downs in subsequent years must be reported as operating expenses.
For the Fortune 100 companies reporting goodwill, this study showed that firms taking goodwill impair-ment charges in 2002 possessed significantly lower earnings in 2002 than did their counterparts not recording the write downs. In 2001 before the opportunity to take these discretionary impairment losses existed, the two groups of companies reported similar earnings levels. In addition to having lower earnings overall in 2002, the group of firms taking the write downs also experienced a significantly higher rate of negative earnings in 2002 than did the non-impairment group. In 2001 when no impairments existed, however, both groups demonstrated similar rates of firms with negative earnings. These results provide compelling evidence that firms practiced big bath earnings manage-ment in the year SFAS No. 142 was adopted.
The big bath theory holds that companies with unusually low earnings in the current year will take large write downs to lower earnings even further. There seems to be little additional penalty for missing the earnings mark by a lot rather than by a little. The large write downs taken in the current year should improve future earnings performance as the burden has already been removed. Although the accounting literature is replete with studies on earnings management in general, there exists a paucity of empirical research specifically testing the big bath theory. However, Walsh et al. (1991) and Chenheiter and Melumad (2002) do provide evidence of its existence. The current study expands the empirical literature on big bath theory and presents additional proof that this method of earnings management is alive and well.In 2002, SFAS No. 142 ended the decades long practice of amortizing goodwill. Instead, firms must now test goodwill annually for impairment and write down this intangible asset if necessary. Applying the impairment test requires the use of significant discretion on the part of management and presents a unique opportunity to manage earnings through big bath charges. SFAS No. 142 provided additional incentive to take big baths in 2002, the year of adoption, by stating that initial write downs taken that year would be reported as a change in accounting principle and, thus, would not affect operating results. Write downs in subsequent years must be reported as operating expenses.For the Fortune 100 companies reporting goodwill, this study showed that firms taking goodwill impair-ment charges in 2002 possessed significantly lower earnings in 2002 than did their counterparts not recording the write downs. In 2001 before the opportunity to take these discretionary impairment losses existed, the two groups of companies reported similar earnings levels. In addition to having lower earnings overall in 2002, the group of firms taking the write downs also experienced a significantly higher rate of negative earnings in 2002 than did the non-impairment group. In 2001 when no impairments existed, however, both groups demonstrated similar rates of firms with negative earnings. These results provide compelling evidence that firms practiced big bath earnings manage-ment in the year SFAS No. 142 was adopted.
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