The issue of how an individual makes personal meaning of a mathematical object
presented in the form of a definition is particularly relevant to the study of advanced
mathematical thinking. In this domain, the learner is frequently expected to construct
the properties of the object from the definition (Tall, 1995). In many instances neither
diagrams nor exemplars of the mathematical object are presented alongside the
definition; initial access to the mathematical object is through the various signs (such
as words and symbols) of the definition.
In this talk, I argue that Vygotsky’s theory of concept formation (1986) provides an
appropriate framework within which to explore the above issue of concept formation.
Specifically I claim that this framework has constructs and notions well−suited to an
explication of the links between the individual’s concept construction and socially
sanctioned mathematical knowledge. Also the framework is apposite to an
examination of how the individual relates to and gives meaning to the signs (such as
symbols and words) of the mathematical definition