Near the end of the 1960s, there were a number of shifts underway throughout the international landscape: the Cold War was the recognized reality of global politics, the long process of decolonization was still forging ahead, and the United States was caught in a quagmire in Vietnam. Repressive and authoritarian dictators con- trolled much of Latin America, the Middle East was still gripped by the drama of the Six-Day War, and an Is- lamic revival was beginning to take root in the Muslim world. In Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was at the apex of his power.
A decade later, the 1979 Revolution and the removal of the pro-US shah from power marked the start of three decades of tension between the United States and Iran. Regional tensions were also substantial. The Cold War was entering its final phase, while Soviet expansionism and war in Afghanistan became the central front of the conflict between the two superpowers. Pakistan was then portrayed as the last line of defense against Soviet expansion, but after its elected prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was removed from power and executed, the government of dictator Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq ush- ered in a long period of military rule, which engaged in a policy of Islamization.26
In this context, Khomeini called on the Muslim world to follow the example of Iran. The transnational drive of the revolution was supported by the notion that Iran represented a “third way” and an alternative socioeco- nomic structure to the two models of capitalism and communism.27 In Khomeini’s view, the social problems that paralyzed much of the world were rooted in op- pressed and dominated nations that were chained to more powerful nations. Regimes that failed to follow the Iranian course were denounced as puppets of West
and East, and their populations were encouraged to rise and revolt against “Westoxification.”28 While Khomei- ni’s anti-imperialist rhetoric had a significant influence on the domestic balance of power between competing political groups, it also had a profound impact on the international relations, foreign orientation, and policies of Iran.29
Still, the Islamic revival was not entirely driven by Kho- meini. Intellectuals throughout the Islamic world were thinking of a new political system and religion became an emerging focal point in terms of national organiza- tion. Moreover, religion became a symbol of a search for ideals of justice and egalitarianism. There was a simmer- ing debate about how Islam could combine with a po- litical system and thus allow it to advance moral values. Khomeini was not only the leading cleric and critic of the shah, but also the leading critic of any political sys- tem that represented American or Western democracy. Of course, the shah was particularly vulnerable to this religio-political critique, and Khomeini seized upon a deteriorating domestic situation by tapping into ideo- logical currents as varied as nationalism, class-conscious- ness, religiosity, and constitutionalism.
The sense of enthusiasm and national pride generated by the revolution caused large portions of the Iranian population to advocate the export of Iranian ideas. In this respect, Khomeini was clever not to align with any one political or religious faction. Rather, he would talk about the export of Islam in general terms. Khomeini wanted people in the Middle East and Arab countries to look at Iran as a viable example of Islamic statehood. Concerning specific targets, Khomeini primarily sought to “export” the values of the revolution to surrounding geographic areas, including the Persian Gulf, the Soviet