of tasks in which workers may make a mistake, whereas the latter underlines the prevention of faulty operations among workers.
Another example of Hyundai’s engineer-oriented approach can be identified in its emphasis on modular production.
Hyundai management set out a long-term plan to develop a modular production system for establishing ‘just-in-sequencing’ (JIS) operations, as illustrated in table 2.
According to the plan, the overall level of modularization increased from 30% in 2005 to 40% in 2006. This modularization has entailed the outsourcing of partssequencing jobs, the automation of modular parts assembly, and the simplification of main production lines (Lee 2003).
As displayed in figure 2, HPS also includes a Toyota-style workplace innovation programme, comprised of ‘basic management’, thereby strengthening the shop-floor ethic of hard work and ‘substance management’, stressing Kaisen activities and manufacturing performance (i.e. quality, operational costs, and productivity).
However, this workplace innovation program and the previous shop-floor campaigns at Hyundai are contrary to the TPS principle of worker involvement, in that they are solely driven by shop-floor management, without production worker commitment.
Instead, college-graduated engineers are the main force of production process innovation, since they are very motivated to apply for numerous patents (i.e. four patents per engineer in 2005) because of a merit-pay system and other performance incentives.
To summarize, Hyundai has developed a production model that deviates from TPS, even though it has tried to emulate TPS via replication of a manufacturing prototype, technical consultancies, and benchmarking over time.
Hyundai’s emulation of TPS is characterized as being (1) a selective and graduated adoption, linked to the expansion of manufacturing capacity, (2) technology-driven radical innovation (Fujimoto 1999, Liker et al. 1999), and (3) an engineer-led and worker-exclusive approach.