importance in a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy or not. The uncertainty
faced by P. despite circumstances under which she had a right to lawful abortion under
the 1993 Family Planning Act, resulted in a striking discrepancy between the theoretical
right and the reality of its implementation. In view of those circumstances, the Court
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.
As regards the complaint concerning the disclosure of the applicants’ personal data, the
Court noted that it was undisputed that the Lublin hospital had issued a press release
concerning P.’s case and that the journalists who had contacted the hospital had been
given information about its circumstances. The Government had argued that the press
release had not contained the applicants’ names or other details making it possible to
establish their identity. However, the information made available to the public had to
have been detailed enough to make it possible for third parties to establish the
applicants’ whereabouts and to contact them, given that following publication of the
press release, P. had been contacted by various people urging her to abandon the
abortion. The fact that P. had disclosed her situation to a friend via text messages could
moreover not be equated with the intention to disclose that information to the public.
There had accordingly been an interference with her right to respect to private life under
Article 8.
The Court did not find that that interference had pursued a legitimate aim. The fact that
the issue of the availability of legal abortion in Poland was a subject of heated debate did
not absolve the medical staff from their professional obligations regarding medical
secrecy. It had not been argued or shown that there had been any exceptional
circumstances to justify public interest in P.’s health. Moreover, no legal provision had
been cited on the basis of which information about individual patients’ health issues
could be disclosed to the general public by way of a press release. There had accordingly
been a violation of Article 8 in that regard as well.
Article 5 § 1
The Court further found a violation of Article 5 § 1. It held in particular that the essential
purpose of P.’s placement in the juvenile shelter had been to separate her from her
parents and to prevent the abortion. In that light, her placement could not be justified as
detention of a minor for the purpose of educational supervision within the meaning of
Article 5 § 1 (d). Had the authorities been concerned that an abortion would be carried
out against P.’s will, less drastic measures than locking up a fourteen-year-old girl
should have - but had not - been considered by the courts.
Article 3
P. had only been fourteen years old at the relevant time and according to the medical
certificate issued after the rape, she had had bruises on her body, indicating that
physical force had been used to overcome her resistance. The Court concluded that she
had been in a situation of great vulnerability when admitted to the hospital. However,
pressure had been exerted on her by the chief doctor who had tried to impose her own
views on her and P. had been obliged to talk to a priest without being asked whether she
in fact wished to see one. Considerable pressure had been put on her and on her
mother. In particular, the latter had been requested to sign a consent form warning that
the abortion could lead to her daughter’s death, without any cogent reasons having been
advanced to show that an abortion in her case could entail such danger.
Furthermore, when P. had been harassed, instead of being protected by the police, she
had instead been placed in a juvenile shelter in execution of the family court’s judgment.
The Court was particularly struck by the fact that the authorities had instituted criminal
proceedings on charges of unlawful intercourse against her who, according to the
prosecutor’s certificate and the forensic findings, should have been considered to be a
importance in a woman’s decision to terminate a pregnancy or not. The uncertainty
faced by P. despite circumstances under which she had a right to lawful abortion under
the 1993 Family Planning Act, resulted in a striking discrepancy between the theoretical
right and the reality of its implementation. In view of those circumstances, the Court
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.
As regards the complaint concerning the disclosure of the applicants’ personal data, the
Court noted that it was undisputed that the Lublin hospital had issued a press release
concerning P.’s case and that the journalists who had contacted the hospital had been
given information about its circumstances. The Government had argued that the press
release had not contained the applicants’ names or other details making it possible to
establish their identity. However, the information made available to the public had to
have been detailed enough to make it possible for third parties to establish the
applicants’ whereabouts and to contact them, given that following publication of the
press release, P. had been contacted by various people urging her to abandon the
abortion. The fact that P. had disclosed her situation to a friend via text messages could
moreover not be equated with the intention to disclose that information to the public.
There had accordingly been an interference with her right to respect to private life under
Article 8.
The Court did not find that that interference had pursued a legitimate aim. The fact that
the issue of the availability of legal abortion in Poland was a subject of heated debate did
not absolve the medical staff from their professional obligations regarding medical
secrecy. It had not been argued or shown that there had been any exceptional
circumstances to justify public interest in P.’s health. Moreover, no legal provision had
been cited on the basis of which information about individual patients’ health issues
could be disclosed to the general public by way of a press release. There had accordingly
been a violation of Article 8 in that regard as well.
Article 5 § 1
The Court further found a violation of Article 5 § 1. It held in particular that the essential
purpose of P.’s placement in the juvenile shelter had been to separate her from her
parents and to prevent the abortion. In that light, her placement could not be justified as
detention of a minor for the purpose of educational supervision within the meaning of
Article 5 § 1 (d). Had the authorities been concerned that an abortion would be carried
out against P.’s will, less drastic measures than locking up a fourteen-year-old girl
should have - but had not - been considered by the courts.
Article 3
P. had only been fourteen years old at the relevant time and according to the medical
certificate issued after the rape, she had had bruises on her body, indicating that
physical force had been used to overcome her resistance. The Court concluded that she
had been in a situation of great vulnerability when admitted to the hospital. However,
pressure had been exerted on her by the chief doctor who had tried to impose her own
views on her and P. had been obliged to talk to a priest without being asked whether she
in fact wished to see one. Considerable pressure had been put on her and on her
mother. In particular, the latter had been requested to sign a consent form warning that
the abortion could lead to her daughter’s death, without any cogent reasons having been
advanced to show that an abortion in her case could entail such danger.
Furthermore, when P. had been harassed, instead of being protected by the police, she
had instead been placed in a juvenile shelter in execution of the family court’s judgment.
The Court was particularly struck by the fact that the authorities had instituted criminal
proceedings on charges of unlawful intercourse against her who, according to the
prosecutor’s certificate and the forensic findings, should have been considered to be a
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