the limitations on legal provisions and procedures for policing orruption, and the weakness of public opposition. Despite a proliferation of laws and commissions on corruption, there are still many areas in which it is possible to circumvent legal restrictions. For instance, commissions on arms purchases are not illegal if they are routed through a third party rather than directly through a military officer involved in the purchasing transaction. Further, many of the procedures for investigating allegations of corruption within the bureaucracy are limited in scope. large measure of discretion to pursue or not to pursue such investigations is given to department heads and other immediate superiors who may be involved in the same corrupt scheme or at least may not be opposed to it on ground of principle Finally the concept of public service as a counterweight to corruption has limited meaning when the public opposition to corruption is weak or non-existent. The people themselves are confused about what is corrupt and not corrupt. They are also not so clear about the concept of what is public good or public service. There has been little pressure from corporate bodies such as business groups ical parties to limit corruption. This ambivalence can contribute to the persistence of corruption. The public lets corrupt officials get away with it The origins of the corruption issue in the 1980s In the traditional sakdina system of government, officials received their appointment from a higher authority but were not remunerated by any flow of income from the same source. They were expected to remunerate themselves by retaining a reasonable portion of the taxes they collected, and by exacting fees for services rendered structure was made quite explicit in the tax-farming This systems which became such a dominant part of the ad ministrative system in the mid-nineteenth century. The king subcontracted out the right to collect taxes, and it was assumed that the subcontractor would reserve a portion for personal use