In e ther case, however, frequent purchasers may become more experienced searche so that Cs falls and larger samples become efficient Thus, if search costs are small relative to the expected purchase price or so that falls and larger samples become efficient Thus, if search costs are small relative to the expected purchase price or the distribution of price and quality combinations is fairly homogeneous or the fre quency of purchase is high relative to the rate of change in the distribution of price and quality combinations, then information asymmetry is unlikely to lead to sig nificant inefficiency In the case where search costs are to the purchase price, the distribution of price and quality combinations is very heteroge- neous, and the frequency of purchase is relatively low, information asymmetry may lead to significant inefficiency. But, if it is possible for producers to distinguish their products by brand, they have an incentive to undertake informative advertising that reduces search costs for consumers. When brands are difficult to establish, as in the case of, say, farm produce, retailers may act as agents for consumers by advertising prices and qualities. Because the veracity of such advertising can be readily deter mined by consumers through inspection of the goods, and because retailers and firms offering brand name products have an incentive to maintain favorable repu- tations, we expect the advertising generally to convey accurate and useful informa- Reputation is likely to be especially important in emerging electronic commerce markets because consumers cannot directly examine goods before purchasing them. For example, one recent study found that sellers' reputation had a statistically sig nificant, albeit small, positive impact on price for an Internet auction good. b In summary, search goods rarely involve information asymmetry that leads to significant and persistent inefficiency inefficiency does occur, it takes the When form of consumers' forgoing purchases that they would have preferred to ones that they nevertheless found beneficial. From the perspective of public policy, inter- vention in markets for search good can rarely be justified on efficiency grounds.