This stylized conception of judicial decision making is not intended to take
any position on how judges behave. This is a very complex question addressed
within a large social science literature. 131 Rather, our central point is that
judicial independence standing alone tells us little about whether and to what
extent RL is subserved unless we have a fuller idea of the risks associated with
varying degrees of judicial freedom. Under one conception of judicial
behavior, RL would be greatly aided by carefully structured judicial
independence, while under another conception, RL would be undermined by
this very same structure. Framing judicial independence in these two
different ways illustrates the multidimensionality of this one RL element. If
corruption is the principal worry, then RL demands especially rigorous ethical
standards and requirements of transparency to boot. 133 We want to be crystal
clear about what interests may be implicated by one or another judicial
structure. 134 We want public-regarding, not private-regarding judicial
decisions. 135 If, instead, we worry principally about judicial partiality, then we
may or may not want judicial independence, depending where the threats to
impartiality arise.