The constitutive elements of a distinctively liberal conception of citizenship are clear enough in theory. It is far less clear how liberal citizenship can be achieved, and what its political consequences are likely to be. Indeed, those questions remain both open and profoundly elusive more than three centuries after liberal citizenship was first theorized in any systematic way – and despite our increasing knowledge growing out of an intensive quest for liberal citizenship.
This chapter first traces the essential principles upon which liberal citizenship is conceived. These principles speak to the nature of individuals, groups, civil society, the state, and supranational regimes, and to the relationships among them. The chapter then considers certain problematics of liberal citizenship – the challenges that confound it conceptually, politically, and institutionally. These challenges arise out of enduring social conditions, including the privatistic and materialistic tendencies of liberal citizens, the inequalities endemic even to relatively egalitarian liberal societies, the decentralizing tendencies of pluralistic politics, and the permeability, incapacities, and attempted neutrality of liberal states. The chapter concludes with a brief and frankly normative assessment of the aspirations and achievements of liberal citizenship.
Several preliminary definitions, observations, and qualifications are in order.
Contemporary political discourse uses the term ‘citizenship’ very loosely, often treating it as little more than an empty vessel into which speakers may pour their own social and political ideals (Schuck, 1998: Ch. 8). Citizenship has become the normative category of choice, invoked by critics of the status quo – on both the Left and the Right – as a vehicle for demanding that the state do more, or less, to advance equality, justice, and participation in the civil society, economy, or polity.
By using ‘citizenship’ here to denote the status of full membership in a society, I effect only a slight improvement. After all, this definition, like others, begs two key questions: what are the relevant determinants of membership? and what are the indicia of fullness? In his magisterial approach to these two questions, T.H. Marshall emphasized the political, social, and economic dimensions of membership and elaborated his own understanding of the conditions necessary to fully achieve them (Marshall, [1950] 1992). But Marshall’s idea of citizenship, published in 1950 at a time of heady enthusiasm about the welfare state among many intellectuals and others, has achieved no more canonical status than has any other. Indeed, given the high stakes in how a society conceives of citizenship, any particular formulation – especially in a discussion as brief as this one must be –is readily contestable.
By ‘liberal citizenship,’ I mean a distinct conception and institutionalization of citizenship whose primary value is to maximize individual liberty. Needless to say, different liberal theorists have defined the nature and requirements of liberty rather differently, and the incidents of liberal citizen turn on which particular version is being invoked. In Isaiah Berlin’s canonical formulation, one can view different accounts of liberalism as ranging from ‘negative liberty’ ideals that emphasize individuals’ right to be left alone and to pursue their own projects free of state compulsion, all the way to ‘positive liberty’ notions. Common to positive liberty accounts is the claim that the state should act affirmatively to create or secure those substantive entitlements (e.g. income, health care, and education) that individuals need in order to lead the dignified, independent lives essential to their freedom (Berlin, 1969).
Different versions of contemporary liberal theory employ different methodologies for deriving principles of justification for state action and citizenship. Theorists defend these principles as being neutral, consensual, or otherwise consistent with liberal values, if not being required by them. Some of these methodologies are neo-contractarian (Nozick, 1977). Other versions are discursive or dialogic in nature; they rely upon propositions defining the particular, constrained forms of argument that might be capable of justifying assertions of power over free individuals (Ackerman, 1980). Still others are hybrid theories, employing a mix of approaches (Rawls, 1971).
The discussion here draws largely upon the debates over liberal citizenship in the United States, where the individualist and state-limiting aspects of liberalism have been most fully reified and the consequences of these aspects most severely criticized (Hartz, 1955; Smith, 1997). The word ‘liberalism,’ to be sure, has acquired a malodorous quality among politicians and many political commentators in the USA since the 1960s. Nonetheless, the fact remains that almost all mainstream political discourse in the USA, regardless of the speaker’s party,