The constitution-making body does not have to concern itself, as it must in a federation, with the manner in which the territory shall be divided into political divisions nor the manner in which governmental powers shall be divided between two authorities. The territorial distribution of power (between the Centre and local bodies) is a matter of internal organization to be decided by the Central Government. The prolonged discussions at the Round Table Conferences in London, which set about drawing up a federal constitution for India, afford ample illustration of the difficulties in a federal constitution. Further the distribution of powers made by the constitution of a federal State is modified, only by a special procedure for federal constitutions must necessarily be rigid. And it is found, notably in the U.S.A. and in Australia, that because of the difficulty of getting the amending body into operation, the changes in the constitution do not keep pace with the changes in the social and economic life of the State. For example, child labour could be abolished easily in England ; its abolition was found difficult in the U.S.A. In the unitary State also, the identical difficulty may arise when its amending body is of the same cumbrous type ; but at any rate the difficulty is not further complicated by a constitutional division of powers with its attendant traditions of State loyalty and the support of vested interests. Federalism, therefore, incidentally tends to produce conservatism. ‘The difficulty of altering the constitution produces conservative sentiment, and national conservatism doubles the difficulty of altering the constitution.’