4.8. Earnings management
Earnings management studies consider three types of management incentive:
contracting, political cost22 and (more recently) capital market arguments. The latter
perspective looks at attempts to influence short-term share price performance or meet
analysts’ forecasts. During the 1990s, the discretionary accruals models of Jones (1991)
and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) came into prominence. However,
McNichols (2000) has recently argued that the earnings management measures based on
these models are not sufficiently powerful or reliable to assess earnings management
behaviour in many contexts. While many studies still examine
aggregate discretionary
accruals, interest is turning towards specific accruals (such as provisions for bad debts and
deferred tax) and distribution-based tests.
Recent UK research in this area has focused on examining the properties of alternative
discretionary accruals models. Young (1999) evaluates the measurement error on five
models, highlighting the limitations of existing models, while Peasnell et al. (2000a)
explore the power of three models (the Jones model, the modified-Jones model and a new
‘margin model’) in cross-sectional specification. They find that the models’ ability to
detect earnings management varies across specific accruals.
Other UK studies have begun to explore the factors that limit earnings management
behaviour, such as corporate governance structures (Peasnell et al., 2000b). There is also a
strand of research that adopts a less quantitative approach to the study of earnings
management. For example, Shah (1998) uses a case study approach that includes
interview, documentary and financial statement evidence to investigate the accounting
treatment of premium put convertibles
4.8. Earnings management
Earnings management studies consider three types of management incentive:
contracting, political cost22 and (more recently) capital market arguments. The latter
perspective looks at attempts to influence short-term share price performance or meet
analysts’ forecasts. During the 1990s, the discretionary accruals models of Jones (1991)
and the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) came into prominence. However,
McNichols (2000) has recently argued that the earnings management measures based on
these models are not sufficiently powerful or reliable to assess earnings management
behaviour in many contexts. While many studies still examine
aggregate discretionary
accruals, interest is turning towards specific accruals (such as provisions for bad debts and
deferred tax) and distribution-based tests.
Recent UK research in this area has focused on examining the properties of alternative
discretionary accruals models. Young (1999) evaluates the measurement error on five
models, highlighting the limitations of existing models, while Peasnell et al. (2000a)
explore the power of three models (the Jones model, the modified-Jones model and a new
‘margin model’) in cross-sectional specification. They find that the models’ ability to
detect earnings management varies across specific accruals.
Other UK studies have begun to explore the factors that limit earnings management
behaviour, such as corporate governance structures (Peasnell et al., 2000b). There is also a
strand of research that adopts a less quantitative approach to the study of earnings
management. For example, Shah (1998) uses a case study approach that includes
interview, documentary and financial statement evidence to investigate the accounting
treatment of premium put convertibles
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