office of the bank will have to adjust its lending. Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2013) show that this mechanism was also important during the European sovereign debt crisis. U.S. branches of European banks faced rapid withdrawals from U.S. wholesale investors, mostly U.S. money market funds, triggered by broad fears about the European sovereign crisis. The branches’ parents replaced some of the outflows with their own funds, but these resources were not enough to compensate for the reduction in financing from non-related sources. As a result, branches had to decrease their lending, which is mostly done through syndicated arrangements. Firms with links to the affected branches endured real adjustment, as they invested less compared to similar firms that had lending relationships with unaffected branches. Transmission of sovereign shocks can also take place indirectly through interbank lending. As shown in Schnabl (2012), a sovereign in stress may lead global banks with exposures to that country to pull back on their lending to banks in other countries. In turn, the domestic banks affected by limited access to international debt markets will cut on their lending and their borrowers will reduce their economic activity. This type of contagion risk grew rapidly prior to the financial crisis of the late 2000s, as global banks became more interconnected and increased their involvement in international capital markets. In sum, sovereign distress can be amplified through the banking sector contributing to the poor macroeconomic outcomes observed after debt crises episodes. Moreover, sovereign debt problems can also by transmitted to third countries through global banks that are directly or indirectly exposed to the sovereign in distress. But lending is not the only activity that banks adjust during debt crises. That will be the subject of the next section. 4.2 Sovereign stress and risk taking