This was a view of things that horrified the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. In its opinion in the second suit, one that had been filed directly in the Supreme Court, it held the convention had no right to exceed the mandate set for it by the legislature that had called it into being. To recognize a broader power was not in any way a vindication of the constituent authority of the people recognized in the Declaration of Rights. The delegates to the convention were elected and assembled for the limited purpose expressed in the enabling legislation. It was only that legislation which was entitled to claim popular sanction. The convention was “the off-spring of law. It had no other source of existence.” To give effect to the unauthorized actions of the convention would, in fact, deprive the people of the right, exercised in the appropriate legislation, to make their own decisions. The defendant officials were, therefore, enjoined from holding the referendum according to the rules prescribed in the convention’s ordinance.72 When Judge Stowe’s decision came before the Supreme Court some time later, it took pains to disassociate itself from his “unsound and dangerous” views. The facts presented did not raise the question of “the power of the legislature to restrain the people,” but “the right of the people by the instrumentality of law to limit their delegates.” “Law is the highest act of a people’s sovereignty while their government and constitution remain unchanged.” The convention could not rise above its legal source.73