Many of Russia’s foreign-policy elite, ranging from official-governmental
actors, the military high command, politicians, and policy analysts, have
advocated the notion of a multipolar post-Cold War world.1 Such
espousals were a frequent feature in official statements of both Yeltsin
and Putin. Multipolarity not only informed Russia’s foreign-policy
thinking generally but also its thinking toward East Asia, which
encompasses the countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia. Although
Russia’s role in East Asia became marginal following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, essentially due to internal turmoil and preoccupation
with economic, political, and social transformation, Russia has consistently
seen itself as a Eurasian power with a justified right to have a say
in East Asian affairs (Rangsimaporn, 2006a). Since 1996, and especially
under Putin, Russian diplomacy has become increasingly active, confi-
dent, and aimed at reasserting Russian influence in this region, not only
politically but also economically through such tools as arms and energy
exports