Typology of Ownership Rights in New Cooperative Models Many economists agree that ownership in the form of secure property rights is the most effective mechanism for providing economic agents with appropriate incentives to create, maintain, and improve assets. But what does “ownership” mean? The economic analysis of ownership has concentrated on two distinct concepts: residual returns (or claims) and residual rights of control. Residual rights of control are defined as the rights to make any decision regard-ing the use of an asset that is not explicitly attenuated by law or assigned to other parties by contract. Residual rights of control emerge from the impossibility of crafting, implementing, and enforcing complete contracts, especially in the case of complex, dynamic transactions. Since all contracts are unavoidably incomplete, the residual right of control over an asset defines who“owns” it (Grossman and Hart). According to the incomplete contract theory of thefirm, the assignment of control rights (and hence ownership) is dictated by ex ante investment incentives of contracting parties. The theory predicts that residual rights of control are as-signed to agents making relationship-specific investments whose quasi-rents are under risk from hold-up behavior.2 Economists define residual claims as the rights to the net income generated by thefirm—i.e., the amount left over after all promised payments tofixed claim holders (e.g., employees, debtors). Additionally, residual claimants are considered the residual risk bearers of the firm because net cash flows are uncertain and
350 Review of Agricultural Economics eventually negative. The“owners”of thefirm are the residual claimants according to property rights scholars (Fama; Fama and Jensen).