It is generally assumed that socially embedded market relationships translate to less
exploitation of farmers, since consumers are supposed to be more willing to share risk
and to commit for the long term (or landlords are willing to cut CSA farmers a break, as
was mentioned earlier), but these data show that social embeddedness also cuts in the
opposite direction. A different form of surplus extraction replaces the surplus extraction
that occurs from unfair market exchanges in conventional markets. Unfair exchanges can
be self-imposed because of a sense of obligation to CSA members, to whom farmers
often feel close. In other words, greater social embeddedness can allow for a sharing of
risk, as CSAs were originally conceived of doing, and even the commodification of these
relationships into community economic rents, as suggested by the CSA farmers with the
highest earnings, but it can also enhance the farmers’ sense of obligation to members to
the farmers’ economic detriment. For example, many CSA farmers noted that they
tended to give too much produce in their shares. As Farmer 13 stated, “I actually
made . . . my CSA shares smaller because I kept [saying], you know, ‘I really want them
to get a good value,’ and they [members] go [in the farms’ questionnaires], ‘We can’t eat
that much!’ [Laughing.] That was consistently the feedback I got. ‘This is too much!’”
Others mentioned the psychological pressure, an interpretation consistent with the
regression model:
You get paid up front but that also means that you have a commitment up front to provide a
basket full of fresh, delicious produce. We have a capitalistic model here, and if your subscriber
doesn’t like it, you are going to lose them. There is a pressure to produce week after week after
week. If you compare that to a farmers’ market, you can bring anything you have, some days
you have more, some days you have less, so what? There is not the psychological pressure
there as with a CSA. You can find CSA farmers out there at night mumbling, “I need more.”
(Farmer 15)
Another significant variable, and one that is negatively related to farmers’ earnings,
was whether the CSA is organized with a direct connection between the farmer and the
members, meaning that a farm partner personally handles communication with the
members. This direct connection is significantly, negatively related to earnings (at the 10
percent level). Personally knowing members well serves the goal of building social
relationships, but it also enhances farmers’ sense of obligation. In contrast, CSAs that
hire someone to handle member relations are more likely to have higher farmers’
earnings. Having a person in this position shields the farmer from a large workload, can
decrease the sense of obligation that can be detrimental to the farmer making a living,
and/or serve as a third party to look after the farmer’s economic interests even if the
farmer neglects them.
The interviews revealed that the obligation and loyalty felt by the farmer toward her or
his members often negates the original CSA equity relationship. Many farmers mentioned feeling pressure to provide a “normal” share, regardless of what happens during
the growing season. Many farmers conform to this pressure by supplementing their boxes
with produce purchased from nearby farmers, often when production is lean or not
diverse (13 percent did so all the time and 44 percent did so sometimes). They feel a
responsibility to provide their members with what they think members expect, which
many farmers described as consistency—of both quantity and diversity from week to
week. In this way, the social embeddedness of the CSA relationship perversely acts to
negate the reciprocal nature of the equity relationship by prompting farmers to engage in
preemptive self-exploitation. CSAs that were run like this, which was common in the
study region, share the bounty in times of plenty, but are not reciprocal when production
is low or homogeneous—the farmers are not sharing the risks of production, but rather
taking a self-inflicted economic hit, one hidden from members since it is not communicated as such. The regression model supports this interpretation that supplementing
boxes means lower earnings. The “share_indicator” variable stands for CSA farmers
purchasing from other farms to supplement their CSA boxes, and was coded categorically (with 0 = never, 0.5 = sometimes, and 1 = always, meaning that the higher the
number, the more likely it is that farmers are spending their own money to supplement
their boxes). This variable is negatively related to earnings, although the relationship is
not significant at the 10 percent level.