We may, then, conclude that in spite of their convincing arguments pluralists the pluralists fail to "expunge" the notion of sovereignty from political theory as they claim. There is yet another interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising fact to note. "While most Pluralists have sought to drive sovereignty out of the front door of their new society, they quietly smuggle it again through back door, more or less disguised, but nevertheless a sovereignty." Such, indeed, is the case with Krabbe's "legal community" ruled by the sense of right Duguit's monistic principle of "social solidarity" , and Cole's "democratic supreme court of functional equity." The pluralists attempt to abolish sovereignty but are finally compelled to restore it. There is always some ultimate authority in society, whether we find it in "natural law", "in reason", in "social solidarity", or in the individual's "sense of right." As soon as we admit the existence of an ultimate power, we must provide a channel for its expression, that is, a "determinate person", as the jurists say, "through whom the voice of the common good is heard. The pluralists may refuse to call this channel the sovereign person, but the fact is that with whatever name we may designate it, sovereignty is still sovereignty. It does not lose the quality of supremacy, no matter by whoin and in which manner it is exercised. In fact, the pluralists are not out to destroy sovereignty, but to recognise it so that the political power shall become the true expression of the community. "To destroy sovereignty", as Hsiao says, "is as dangerous as it is futile.